無痛感 Impassibility
摘錄自何頓著，《基督徒的信仰》（麥種，2016），第六章
Chapter
6: God: The Incommunicable Attributes 2) Incommunicable Attributes d. Impassibility
無痛感（impassibility；或譯為不動情）表示「免疫於痛苦」。神會受我們影響嗎？我們對這問題的答案，已經在很大程度上由我們對神的單一、自存和不可改變的觀點所決定。一旦我們否認神是獨立於世界的（自存），便很難避免滑向以自己的形像創造神。如果神倚靠世界，至少在原則上，神就可以被世界的反對所懾服和克服。開放神論者雖然談及神有無限的豐富，也不能排除一個可能性，即神的拯救目的最終會大規模地受到挫敗，即使對那些不分享新造的榮耀的人來說，也顯然是這樣。Impassibility means
“immunity to suffering.” Is God affected by us?
Our answer to this question is already determined to a large extent by our view
of God’s simplicity, aseity, and immutability. Once we deny God’s independence
from the world (aseity), it is difficult to avoid the slide toward creating God
in our own image. If God is dependent on the world, then it follows that, in
principle at least, God can become overwhelmed and overcome by the world’s
opposition. All of the talk among open theists of God’s infinite
resourcefulness cannot eliminate the possibility that God’s saving purposes
will finally be thwarted on a grand scale, even as they are ostensibly in the
case of those who do not share in the glory of the new creation.
1. 界定無痛感 1. DEFINING IMPASSIBILITY
首先，重要的是界定我們所謂無痛感的意思。由於在斯多亞派和基督教神學中都使用這個希臘詞語apatheia，這個詞語很容易被誤解為指無痛感的同一觀念。[1] 不過，斯多亞哲學所追求的冷漠或漠不關心的目標─對傷害免疫，或對那種人的快樂必須仰賴他人的喜悅具有免疫力─與基督教的觀念相距甚遠。這個在意義上的差別，因為拉丁語的同源詞passus在英語passion這個詞中通常被理解為一般的情感，從而變得更為模糊。不過，在其歷史神學語境下，無痛感更為具體。正如布雷（Gerald Bray）指出的，希臘神學家大馬士革的約翰清楚界定神的apatheia為「受苦」方面的（正如基督的受難）。「不是強調在漠不關心的狀態下的平靜，而是強調神的至高主權。」[2] First, it is
important to define what we mean by impassibility. The Greek word apatheia,
because it is used in Stoicism and Christian theology, may easily be
misunderstood as referring to the same idea as impassibility. 47 However, the
apathy or indifference at which the Stoic philosopher aimed — immunity to the
harm or the delight that makes one’s happiness dependent on others — is far
from the Christian conception. This difference in meaning is further obscured
by the fact that the Latin cognate, passus, is typically understood in the
English word passion to refer to emotions generally. However, in its
historical-theological context, impassibility is more specific. As Gerald Bray
points out, the Greek theologian John of Damascus clearly defined God’s
apatheia as “suffering” (as in the passion of Christ). “The emphasis was not on
tranquility in a state of indifference, but on the sovereignty of God.”48
2. 評估無痛感的教義2. EVALUATING THE DOCTRINE OF
IMPASSIBILITY
柏拉圖從諸神的自足推論他們的屬性，因而教導說諸神甚至不能愛。同樣，在我們自己的時代，米爾班克（John Milbank）主張，嚴格來說，神聖的無痛感表示神不受我們的罪冒犯，因此不需要滿足祂的公義。[3] 這甚至排除赦免和忿怒的可能。很明顯，這種觀點在聖經啟示中找不到根據。因此像奧古斯丁這樣的基督徒神學家承繼的困難，是怎樣同時持守神既獨立於世界之外，又肯定神是愛。范浩沙解釋說：「奧古斯丁解決神的愛的弔詭的方法，是提出一種恰當的神聖的愛，恩賜的愛：聖愛（agape）。」換句話說，神的愛是出於純粹豐富和自足，而不是為了得回甚麼作回報。[4] Deducing the
attributes of the gods from their self-sufficiency, Plato taught that the gods
cannot even love. Similarly, in our own day John Milbank argues that divine
impassibility means that, strictly speaking, God is not offended by our sin and
therefore does not require a satisfaction of his justice.49 This eliminates
even the possibility of forgiveness, as well as wrath. Obviously, this view
could find no foothold in biblical revelation. So the problem inherited by
Christian theologians, such as Augustine, was how to hold simultaneously to
God’s independence from the world and the central affirmation of God as love.
Kevin Vanhoozer explains, “Augustine’s solution to the paradox of God’s love is
to posit a properly divine kind of love, a gift-love: agape.” In other words,
God loves out of sheer abundance and self-sufficiency, not in order to receive
anything in return.50
奧古斯丁跟隨柏拉圖的傳統，而不是斯多亞的傳統，並不懼怕eros（「出於需要的欲望」），「玷污」的愛這種說法。人類出於自利和對別人的重視而交換禮物，是完全自然和恰當的。無論如何，奧古斯丁不認為可能以純粹斯多亞派的漠不關心而將自利從愛中排除，好像康德和現代倫理想像的那樣。奧古斯丁主張，就神來說，事情卻不同，因為萬有的存在都是本於祂，倚靠祂，並歸於祂，而祂卻不需要甚麼。Following the
Platonic rather than Stoic tradition, Augustine had no fear of eros (“desire
out of need”), “tainting” love. It was perfectly natural and appropriate for
human beings to exchange gifts out of self-interest and regard for the other.
In any case, Augustine did not think it possible to eliminate self-interest
from love in a pure kind of Stoic indifference that Kant and modern ethics
imagine. Augustine argues that things are different when it comes to God, since
all things exist from him, through him, and for him, and he stands in need of
nothing.
柏拉圖的錯誤，是以為甚麼也不需要的神就不能夠愛；我認為，當代對神無痛感的批評者的錯誤，是以為能夠愛的神必定有需要。在太快批評奧古斯丁陷入希臘的前設而不是聖經的前設之前，我們應該再次記得保羅的講詞：「創造宇宙和其中萬物的神，既是天地的主，就不住人手所造的殿，也不用人手服事，好像缺少甚麼；自己倒將生命、氣息、萬物賜給萬人」（徒十七24～25）。在羅馬書，保羅引述約伯記三十五章7節（參：四十一11）：「『誰是先給了祂，使祂後來償還呢？』因為萬有都是本於祂，倚靠祂，歸於祂。願榮耀歸給祂，直到永遠。阿們！」（羅十一35～36）。人類（本性是有需要的）為了自我實現和出於對別人的重視而互送禮物是恰當的。不過，「各樣……全備的賞賜都是從上頭來的，從眾光之父那裏降下來的；在祂並沒有改變，也沒有轉動的影兒」（雅一17，強調字體為引者標明）。Plato’s mistake was to think that a God who needs nothing
cannot love; in my view, the mistake of bcontemporary critics of divine
impassibility is to think that a God who loves must be needy. Before we
criticize Augustine too quickly as mired in Greek rather than biblical
presuppositions, we should recall again Paul’s speech: “The God who made the
world and everything in it, being the Lord of heaven and earth, does not live
in temples made by man, nor is he served by human hands, as though he needed
anything, since he himself gives to all mankind life and breath and everything”
(Ac 17:24 – 25). In Romans, Paul cites Job 35:7 (cf. 41:11): “‘Or who has given
a gift to him that he might be repaid?’ For from him and through him and to him
are all things. To him be glory forever. Amen” (Ro 11:35 – 36). It is
appropriate for humans (who are by nature needy) to offer gifts to each other
for self-fulfillment and out of regard for the other. However, “Every … perfect
gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights with whom there is no
variation or shadow due to change” (Jas 1:17, emphasis added).
奧古斯丁跟隨柏拉圖的傳統，而不是斯多亞的傳統，並不懼怕eros（「出於需要的欲望」），「玷污」的愛這種說法。人類出於自利和對別人的重視而交換禮物，是完全自然和恰當的。無論如何，奧古斯丁不認為可能以純粹斯多亞派的漠不關心而將自利從愛中排除，好像康德和現代倫理想像的那樣。奧古斯丁主張，就神來說，事情卻不同，因為萬有的存在都是本於祂，倚靠祂，並歸於祂，而祂卻不需要甚麼。Following the
Platonic rather than Stoic tradition, Augustine had no fear of eros (“desire
out of need”), “tainting” love. It was perfectly natural and appropriate for
human beings to exchange gifts out of self-interest and regard for the other.
In any case, Augustine did not think it possible to eliminate self-interest
from love in a pure kind of Stoic indifference that Kant and modern ethics
imagine. Augustine argues that things are different when it comes to God, since
all things exist from him, through him, and for him, and he stands in need of
nothing.
柏拉圖的錯誤，是以為甚麼也不需要的神就不能夠愛；我認為，當代對神無痛感的批評者的錯誤，是以為能夠愛的神必定有需要。在太快批評奧古斯丁陷入希臘的前設而不是聖經的前設之前，我們應該再次記得保羅的講詞：「創造宇宙和其中萬物的神，既是天地的主，就不住人手所造的殿，也不用人手服事，好像缺少甚麼；自己倒將生命、氣息、萬物賜給萬人」（徒十七24～25）。在羅馬書，保羅引述約伯記三十五章7節（參：四十一11）：「『誰是先給了祂，使祂後來償還呢？』因為萬有都是本於祂，倚靠祂，歸於祂。願榮耀歸給祂，直到永遠。阿們！」（羅十一35～36）。人類（本性是有需要的）為了自我實現和出於對別人的重視而互送禮物是恰當的。不過，「各樣……全備的賞賜都是從上頭來的，從眾光之父那裏降下來的；在祂並沒有改變，也沒有轉動的影兒」（雅一17，強調字體為引者標明）。Plato’s mistake was to think that a God who needs nothing
cannot love; in my view, the mistake of bcontemporary critics of divine
impassibility is to think that a God who loves must be needy. Before we
criticize Augustine too quickly as mired in Greek rather than biblical
presuppositions, we should recall again Paul’s speech: “The God who made the
world and everything in it, being the Lord of heaven and earth, does not live
in temples made by man, nor is he served by human hands, as though he needed
anything, since he himself gives to all mankind life and breath and everything”
(Ac 17:24 – 25). In Romans, Paul cites Job 35:7 (cf. 41:11): “‘Or who has given
a gift to him that he might be repaid?’ For from him and through him and to him
are all things. To him be glory forever. Amen” (Ro 11:35 – 36). It is
appropriate for humans (who are by nature needy) to offer gifts to each other
for self-fulfillment and out of regard for the other. However, “Every … perfect
gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights with whom there is no
variation or shadow due to change” (Jas 1:17, emphasis added).
奧古斯丁對神的聖愛的詮釋，反映出基督徒在柏拉圖主義和斯多亞主義以外一個有洞見的選擇；然而，他無法明白神的快樂如何可以以任何方式受到被造物的影響。當然，在他的註釋中，奧古斯丁可以肯定神審判、有憐憫、被人激怒等等。但這些話不單是類比性地得到了肯定；它們也經常被搪塞過去，被視為不適合一位在祂本身已經就是完全的神。我認為，這個傾向在很大程度上是出於沒有區分神的本質和能量。但有了這個重要的區分，我們便可以說神的能量（作為）有時可以受到被造物的行動影響，而神的本質和諭旨則不會改變。Although Augustine’s interpretation of God’s agape love reflects
an insightful Christian alternative to Platonism and Stoicism, he could not see
how God’s bliss could be in any way affected by creatures. Of course, in his
commentaries Augustine could affirm that God judged, had compassion, was roused
to anger, and so forth. But such expressions are not only affirmed
analogically; they are frequently explained away as unbefitting for a
self-complete God. In my view, this tendency rests largely on the lack of any
distinction between God’s essence and energies. Yet with this important
distinction, we are able to say that while God’s energies (acts) may sometimes
be affected by creaturely action, God’s essence and decree do not change.
3. 近期對無痛感的批評3. RECENT CRITICISM OF
IMPASSIBILITY
在晚近的神學中，對神的無痛感的批評已經變成一種小規模的、缺乏組織的事業，因為它站在大屠殺的陰影下。[5] 例如：莫特曼，尤其是在《被釘十字架的上帝》（The Crucified God，1972）和《三一與上帝國》（The Trinity and the Kingdom，1981）中，[6] 重複一個批評，說傳統的神的教義是希臘哲學的產物，多過於是聖經的教導。但他自己的詮釋是來自一個中心命題─神的絕對本性是「受苦的愛」─的一連串推論，而他訴諸猶太神祕哲學、伯默（Jakob B?hme）、黑格爾和謝林以及更多近期的純理論思想家來建立這個命題。Criticism of divine
impassibility has become something of a cottage industry in recent theology,
standing as it does in the shadow of the Holocaust.51 Jürgen Moltmann, for instance, especially in The
Crucified God (1972) and The Trinity and the Kingdom (1981),52 repeats the
criticism that the traditional doctrine of God is the product of Greek
philosophy more than of biblical teaching. Yet his own interpretation is a
series of deductions from a central thesis of God’s essential nature as
“suffering love,” which he develops by appealing to Jewish Kabbalism, Jakob
B?hme, G. W. F. Hegel, and Friedrich Schelling, as well as more recent
speculative thinkers.
根據這個觀點，神不是全能的，而是與人一同受苦，藉著在自己的存有中忍受邪惡而轉化邪惡。因此，在神的本質中，有可悲的一面，就是神必須透過歷史的「成為」來進行征服。[7] 莫特曼混淆了神的本質和祂的能量以及神格的位格，因而說到，神「從愛中受苦，這愛是祂存有的超級豐盛和湧流。」[8] 將神的所有屬性化約為「受苦的愛」之後，他得出一個特點，是最終可以描述（單義地）神的本質的：「神的自我降卑」。[9] 一些十九世紀的神學家提倡虛己（kenosis）這個觀念，來解釋永恆的子在成為肉身時「倒空自己」，但莫特曼（和黑格爾很像）將這個觀念應用到神永恆的存有。[10] 在莫特曼的神聖受苦神學中，類比頗容易滑進單義裏。他說：「神所擁有的唯一全能是受苦的愛這樣的全能。」[11] 神不單有自由向罪人顯示憐憫的愛；祂永恆的本性也是受苦的愛。[12] 因此，神對罪人的憐憫不是自由的決定。相反，「自我犧牲是神的本性和本質。」[13] In this view,
God is not Almighty, but cosufferer who transforms evil into good by suffering
evil in his very being. Within God’s essence, therefore, there is a tragic
aspect that God must conquer through historical becoming.53 Confusing God’s
essence with his energies as well as with the persons of the Godhead, Moltmann
says that God “suffers from the love which is the superabundance and
overflowing of his being.”54 After reducing all of God’s attributes to
“suffering love,” he arrives at one characteristic that is finally descriptive
(univocally) of the divine essence: “God’s self-humiliation.”55 So where some
nineteenth-century theologians advocated the concept of kenosis as a way of
explaining the “self-emptying” of the eternal Son in the incarnation, Moltmann
(much like Hegel) applies the concept to God’s eternal being.56 Analogy slips
rather easily into univocity in Moltmann’s theology of divine suffering. “The
sole omnipotence which God possesses,” he says, “is the almighty power of
suffering love.”57 God is not only free to show compassionate love toward
sinners; his eternal nature is suffering love.58 God’s compassion toward
sinners is not, therefore, a free decision. Rather, “Self-sacrifice is God’s
very nature and essence.”59
莫特曼堅持作為神聖受苦的來源的自由又怎樣呢？在這受苦的愛中，神不單在世界完成一些事（也就是赦罪），也主要在祂自己裏面完成一些事。由於受苦屬於神永恆的存有，祂同時在自己和世界裏面克服它。「受苦的愛克服邪惡的粗暴，並救贖能量脫離邪惡，這能量原是好的，只不過其熱情被誤導罷了。」[14] 對莫特曼來說（和黑格爾一樣），基督的成為肉身和死亡似乎是象徵神永恆的存有正在「成為」，而不是憐憫的愛自由的決定。事實上，「透過受苦的愛救贖的過程乃是進化的過程」，而不是十字架。[15] 對神義論（theodicy）（邪惡的問題）的理解，在決定莫特曼關乎神的教義這件事情上尤其明顯，他猜測：「如果神在永恆中、在祂的本性中已經是愛，是受苦的愛和自我犧牲，邪惡必定已經和神自己一起存在，而不單是和創造一起存在，更不用說和人的墮落一起存在了。」[16] What happened
to the freedom that Moltmann insisted on as the source of divine passion? In
this suffering love, God is not merely working something out in the world
(namely, the forgiveness of sins), but chiefly working something out in
himself. Since suffering belongs to God’s eternal being, he is overcoming it in
himself and in the world simultaneously. “Suffering love overcomes the
brutality of evil and redeems the energy in evil, which is good, through the
fulfillment which it gives to this misguided passion.”60 Christ’s incarnation
and death appear to be, for Moltmann (like Hegel), a symbol of God’s eternal
being-in-becoming rather than a free decision of merciful love. In fact, not
the cross but “the process of evolution is the process of redemption through
suffering love.”61 The grip of theodicy (the problem of evil) in determining
Moltmann’s doctrine of God is particularly obvious in his speculation that “if
God is already in eternity and in his very nature love, suffering love, and
self-sacrifice, then evil must already have come into existence with God
himself, not merely with creation, let alone with the fall of man.”62
摩尼教（Manichaeism）和其他二元的本體論，將善和惡置於兩個敵對的神明裏面，而莫特曼則似乎在神的存有裏面綜合了善和惡。因此，莫特曼認同甘乃迪（G. A. Studdert
Kennedy）的結論：「神，在歷史各處都是愛的父神，但無一處是全能的。」[17] 訴諸伯默、黑格爾、叔本華和諸如烏納穆諾（Miguel de Unamuno）和貝德耶夫（Nicholas Berdyaev）這些更近期的作者，莫特曼提出在神的存有中的一個矛盾─「神裏面的一個悲劇」，這看起來有時好像精神層面的摩尼教。[18] 神的「黑暗面」被勾消到更高的綜合中，正如黑格爾那純理論的系統一樣。我們不能將神設想為「超越歷史」，因為歷史的苦難（體現在耶穌的歷史中）屬於神永恆的本性。[19] 由於神和世界透過受苦的歷史互相倚靠，「不單我們需要神的憐憫；神也需要我們的憐憫。……解救世界脫離矛盾，無異於神解救自己脫離祂的世界的矛盾。」[20] 十字架引發出這個問題：「『這是代贖的神，祂想除去祂良心的罪疚，除去創造了人、同時又創造了邪惡和苦難的譴責嗎？』」[21] While
Manichaeism and other dualistic ontologies ground good and evil in two opposing
gods, Moltmann seems to synthesize good and evil within the being of God. Thus
Moltmann approves G. A. Studdert Kennedy’s conclusion: “God, the Father God of
Love, is everywhere in history, but nowhere is he Almighty.”63 Appealing to
B?hme, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and more recent writers such as Miguel de Unamuno
and Nicholas Berdyaev, Moltmann posits a contradiction in God’s being — a
“tragedy in God,” that looks at times like a psychological Manichaeism.64 God’s
“dark side” is sublated into a higher synthesis, just as it is in Hegel’s
speculative system. God cannot be conceived of as being “beyond history,” since
historical suffering (concretized in the history of Jesus) belongs to God’s
eternal nature.65 Given the interdependence of God and the world via the
history of suffering, “It is not only that we need God’s compassion; God also
needs ours…. The deliverance of the world from its contradiction is nothing
less than God’s deliverance of himself from the contradiction of his world.”66
The cross provokes the question, “‘Is this the atoning God, who wants to clear
his conscience of the guilt, the reproach of having created man, and at the
same time evil and suffering?’”67
莫特曼站在我們稱為本體論（「克服疏離」）的範式中，而不是聖約的範式（「與陌生人相遇」），他堅決認為：「神兒子的成為肉身不是對罪的答案。那是實現神的永恆渴望─要成為人，並·要讓每個人都出於恩典而成為神；使一個『他者』參與到神聖的生命裏，回報神聖的愛。」[22] 因此，毫不令人驚訝的是，莫特曼補充說：「基督十字架的概念，使『形而上的變成歷史的』，『歷史的變成形而上的』。」[23] 當我們讀到，「但自由沒有來源；它是終極的邊界。但因為自由存在，神自己受苦並被釘十字架」時，[24] 「受苦的自由」不就脫離神，而以這樣的方式被神化了嗎？使「存有」（本身是邪惡的，而不是受造為好的）與神和好，而不是令罪人與神和好，就成了這個系統的目標。對莫特曼來說，「神不是主；祂是憐憫的父。」[25] Standing in
what we have been calling the ontological (“overcoming estrangement”) as opposed to the covenantal paradigm (“meeting a stranger”), Moltmann insists, “The incarnation of God’s Son is not an answer to sin.
It is the fulfillment of God’s eternal longing to become man and to make of
every man a god out of grace; an ‘Other’ to participate in the divine life and
return the divine love.”68 Not surprisingly, then, Moltmann adds, “Perfection
of Christ’s cross makes ‘the metaphysical historical’ and ‘the historical
metaphysical.’”69 Is not “suffering freedom” abstracted from God and divinized
in this way when we read, “but freedom has no origin; it is an ultimate
frontier. But because freedom exists, God himself suffers and is
crucified"?70 Reconciling “being” — inherently evil rather than created
good — rather than reconciling sinners to God becomes the goal of such a
system. For Moltmann, “God is not the Lord; he is the merciful Father.”71
我們不應該投射出一個神，來滿足我們根據存在主義對悲劇所做的詮釋，而是必須容許聖經的類比轉化我們的推理。正如哈特（David Bentley Hart）指出的，教父關於神的無痛感（apatheia）的教義，並沒有提到神不能愛或不能與受造物建立關係。事實上，諷刺的是，「在我們嘗試修訂三一論教義，令神根據奧希維茲（Auschwitz，納粹集中營）來看是可以理解的時，無可避免地，我們所描述的這位神，最終─變成─實際上只是奧希維茲的形而上基礎。」[26] 換句話說，如果苦難─甚至邪惡─屬於神必然和永恆的存有，這不是將恐怖神化嗎？而且，如果邪惡和痛苦屬於神的本性，我們怎能說神打敗邪惡和痛苦？少了我們，神仍然是神，卻選擇成為與我們同在並幫助我們；這個驚人的宣告，在莫特曼的理論裏就降服在這種非榮耀頌的邏輯之下，即有這樣的一種神明，是只能藉著限制自己來容許我們存在，並只能夠藉著分擔我們的苦難才能處理我們的苦難的。Instead of
projecting a God who satisfies our existential interpretation of tragedy, we
need to allow the biblical analogies to transform our reasoning. As David
Bentley Hart observes, the patristic doctrine of God’s apatheia nowhere
suggests that God is incapable of loving or entering into relations with
creatures. In fact, it is ironic that, “in our attempts to revise trinitarian doctrine
in such a way as to make God comprehensible in the ‘light’ of Auschwitz,
invariably we end up describing a God who — it turns out — is actually simply
the metaphysical ground of Auschwitz.”72 In other words, if suffering — even
evil — belongs to God’s essential and eternal being, then does this not
divinize horror? Furthermore, how could God be said to defeat evil and pain if
these belong to his nature? In Moltmann, the staggering announcement that the
God who is God without us nevertheless chose to be God with and for us
surrenders to the nondoxological logic of a deity who can only allow for our
existence by limiting himself and can only deal with our suffering by sharing
it.
4. 在兩難之間航行4. NAVIGATING BETWEEN SCYLLA
AND CHARYBDIS
新黑格爾神學與斯多亞主義的不同，在於它們對於是甚麼構成完美的存有所做的假設，但諷刺的是，兩者之間的距離（特別是在接受萬有在神論的本體論方面）都比任何一方與聖經信仰的距離更近。「哲學家的神」很容易是赫拉克利特和黑格爾的投射，也同樣容易是柏拉圖和普羅提努（Plotinus）的投射。范浩沙總結說：萬有在神論似乎是今天神學最流行的範式，[27] 他這說法肯定是正確的。他指出：「對古典有神論來說，神的愛是關乎祂至高的旨意，關乎善意：為他人的益處而定意並行動，」而「萬有在神論者主張神的愛更是關乎情感上的同情（『我感受到你的痛苦』）。」[28] 同時，「描述神是因果的執行者，就將古典有神論擄去，」令人「很難調和神的愛與個人關係這個觀念」。[29] 我們怎樣在斯多亞派萬有在神論和黑格爾萬有在神論之間航行呢？Neo-Hegelian
theologies differ with Stoicism in their assumptions about what constitutes a
perfect being, but ironically the two are closer to each other (especially in
embracing a panentheistic ontology) than either is to biblical faith. The “god
of the philosophers” is as easily the projection of Heracleitus and Hegel as of
Plato and Plotinus. Vanhoozer is surely correct in concluding that panentheism
appears to be the most popular paradigm in theology today.73 “For classical
theism,” he points out, “God’s love is a matter of his sovereign will, of
benevolence: willing and acting for the other’s good,” whereas “the panentheist
suggests that God’s love is more a matter of affective empathy (‘I feel your
pain’).”74 At the same time, “A picture of God as causal agent holds classical
theism captive,” which makes it “difficult to reconcile divine love with the
notion of personal relation.”75 How do we navigate between Stoicism and
Hegelian panentheism?
一方面，我們必須避免一個結論，認為神不受造物的苦難觸動或感動。從俄利根到麥蒙尼德（Maimonides）到斯賓諾莎和康德，確實有一條斯多亞派的線貫穿，否認神經歷喜樂或哀傷；認為祂既不愛也不恨。事實上，斯多亞主義的痕跡在古代、中世紀和現代的基督徒作家中都明顯可見。不過，斯多亞主義那漠不關心的神與聖經中那位永活的神十分不同。我們怎能向這位神祈禱，並以任何方式個別地和祂交往呢？On one hand, we
must avoid the conclusion that God is untouched or unmoved by creaturely
suffering. There is indeed a Stoic thread that runs from Origen to Maimonides
to Spinoza and Kant that denies that God experiences joy or sorrow; he neither
loves nor hates. In fact, traces of Stoicism are evident among
Christianbwriters in the ancient, medieval, and modern period. However, the
indifferent god of Stoicism is radically different from the living God of
Scripture. How can one pray to this God or be personally related to him in any
way?
另一方面，神是超越的聖約之主，祂從來都不是被動的受害人，總是主動的審判官和稱義者。即使聖經（以類比的方式）將神啟示為是在回應世界，特別是在立約關係中回應人類，那也與我們彼此回應的方式不同。即使神聽到祂受苦的百姓在埃及的呼喊，解救他們，祂也是以這樣的身分解救他們的：祂已經揀選了以色列，並預先告訴亞伯蘭，這件會引致他們被擄和得解救的事件會怎樣發生（創十五13～21）。即使子成了肉身，屈從於人類叛逆最殘忍的不公義，祂也是主動地這樣做：「沒有人奪我的命去，是我自己捨的。我有權柄捨了，也有權柄取回來。這是我從我父所受的命令」（約十18）。神憐憫罪人的回應總是自由的行動。為了避免「斯多亞」的抽離和「黑格爾」的倚靠這些極端，我們應該謹記幾點。On the other hand,
God is the transcendent Lord of the covenant who is never a passive victim but
is always the active judge and justifier. Even if God is revealed in Scripture
(analogically) as responding to the world and especially to human beings in a
covenantal relationship, it is not in the same way we respond to each other.
Even when God hears the cry of his afflicted people in Egypt and delivers them,
it is as the one who had already elected Israel and foretold to Abram the
events that would lead up to their captivity and deliverance (Ge 15:13 — 21).
Even as the Son became flesh and submitted to the cruelest injustice of human
rebellion, he did so voluntarily: “No one takes [my life] from me, but I lay it
down of my own accord. I have authority to lay it down, and I have authority to
take it up again. This charge I have received from my Father” (Jn 10:18). God’s
merciful responsiveness to sinners is always a free act. To avoid the extremes
of “Stoic” detachment and “Hegelian” dependence, we should bear a few points in
mind.
首先，要避免的錯誤選擇是，要不是神與世界發生關聯（理論用詞，意思是祂需要世界才能存在），就是世界與神沒有關係。對開放神論者來說，神和世界之間真正的關係必然會從兩個方向進行：神必須被動地與世界發生關聯（因此某種意義上要倚靠世界），世界也必須被動地與神發生關係。諷刺的是，在這方面，它更接近斯多亞主義，多過於接近古典基督信仰。神獨立於世界是基督教獨特的主題，設計來使我們的思想脫離這種異教的假設。因此，這裡存在一種關係，但我們生活、動作、存留都在於神；而不是神的生活、動作、存留都在於我們（徒十七28）。[30] 由於神已經主動地使世人與祂自己相交，甚至到一個程度，取了我們的肉身，祂就可以經歷受造界的實存─事實上也的確比我們更深刻地經歷到這實存。如果否認無痛感代表著要神必須倚靠世界（理論用詞是與世界發生關聯）的危險，我們也必須抗拒下面這種為無痛感辯護的方式：神使世界與祂自己建立關係，卻對祂的能量（也就是祂在神人關係中的立約行動）沒有影響。First, the false
choice to be avoided is that either God is related to the world (in the technical
sense, as needing the world for his existence) or the world bears no relation
to God. For open theists, a genuine God-world relationship must run in both
directions: God must be related to (and therefore in some sense dependent on)
the world, as well as vice versa. In this respect, ironically, it is closer to
Stoicism than to classical Christianity. God’s independence from the world was
a distinctively Christian theme, designed to reorient our thinking away from
such pagan assumptions. Thus, there is a relation, but we live and move and
have our being in God rather than vice versa (Ac 17:28).76 Because God has
related the world to himself, even to the point of assuming our flesh, he can
experience creaturely reality — and in fact does experience it more deeply than
we. If the denial of impassibility represents the danger of making God
dependent on (i.e., in the technical sense, related to) the world, we must also
resist a defense of impassibility in which God’s relating of the world to
himself has no impact on his energies (i.e., his covenantal activity in the
divine-human relationship).
神喜悅祂手所作的工，我們與祂的團契，我們的敬拜，以及我們對鄰舍的愛和服事。但神不需要這一切來得到滿足。事實上，正因為祂甚麼也不需要，祂向造物顯示的愛才是具有創造力的。不是因為神缺乏感情，而是因為祂一無所缺，祂才自由地愛。神確實有感覺，但祂的喜樂不倚靠世界。神以憐憫回應我們的哀傷，以忿怒回應我們的罪，以喜悅回應我們的順服。但祂這樣做的身分，是慷慨的施愛者，而不是有需要的愛者。God delights in the
work of his hands, in our fellowship with him, in our worship, and in the love
and service we render to our neighbor. Yet God needs none of this for his own
fulfillment. In fact, it is because he needs nothing that the love he shows to
creatures is creative. It is not because God lacks emotion that he loves in
freedom, but because he does not lack anything. God does feel, but not as one
who depends on the world for his joy. God responds to our sorrows with compassion,
to our sin with anger, and to our obedience with delight. Yet he does so as a
generous rather than as a needy lover.
神賜予生命，但不接受生命；世界倚靠神，但神不倚靠世界。同樣，我們可以說神受我們影響，但祂的存有、意志或行動不由我們決定。神自由地容許我們影響祂，雖然甚至我們施予影響的行動也在神永恆的決議中得到理解。甚至我們的禱告，也是神從起初已經決定好要在歷史中行事的管道。同樣，神計劃我們的救贖，不是因為人的墮落出乎祂的意料而做出的回應，而是祂自己在創造的行動前就已決定的。正因為神的愛是出於自決的自由，而不是出於需要，因此，雖然人類伙伴沒有回應，祂仍然可以愛，畢竟，福音驚人地啟示神的恩典，其高潮即在於宣告：當我們還作神仇敵的時候，祂已經先愛了我們（羅五10；林前二14；弗二1～5）。我們對神的愛可以類比於神對我們的愛；但神對我們的愛在本質上依然是獨特的，這就是我們在神裏面的盼望的保障（約壹四10）。God gives life but does not
receive life; the world depends on God, but God does not depend on the world.
Similarly, we can say that God is affected by us but is not determined in his
being, will, or actions by us. God freely allows us to affect him, although
even our affecting action is comprehended in God’s eternal counsel. Even our
prayers are means through which God works out in history that which he has
already determined from the beginning. Similarly, God did not plan our
redemption as a reaction to a fall that surprised him but as a
self-determination prior to the act of creation. It is because God loves out of
self-determining freedom rather than need that he can love in spite of the
unresponsiveness of the human partner. After all, the gospel’s astonishing
revelation of God’s grace reaches its climax in the announcement that God loved
us while we were hostile toward him (Ro 5:10; 1Co 2:14; Eph 2:1 – 5). Our love
for God is analogical of God’s love for us; the latter remains qualitatively
distinct, and therein lies the security of our hope in God (1Jn 4:10).
第二，務必要牢記在心的是，無痛感指的是神的本質，而不是指有分於此本質的特定位格。受被造之物影響的是三一神的三個位格，不是神的本質本身。這甚至對人類來說也是真實的。即使在喜悅或絕望這些改變生命的經驗中，個人的人性也沒有改變；改變的是那個人。本質（或本性）不能感覺、定意或行動。只有位格可以愛、失望或喜悅、忿怒或快樂、困擾或滿足。神的本質不是一個位格。只有分享這本質的位格可以受影響。如此愛世人，甚至賜下祂兒子，並在忿怒和審判中轉離那背負罪人的罪的救主的，是父神，而不是神的本質。愛是神的本質的一種屬性（「神就是愛」〔約壹四8、16〕），但只有神聖的位格會愛（動詞）。Second, it is crucial to bear in mind that
impassibility refers to God’s essence rather
than to the particular persons who share it. It is the persons of the Trinity
who are affected by creatures, not the divine essence itself. This is true even
of human beings. Even in life-altering experiences of delight or despair, one’s
humanity is not altered; rather, the person is changed. Essences (or natures)
cannot feel, will, or act. Only persons can love, be disappointed or delighted,
angry or pleased, disturbed or satisfied. God’s essence is not a person. It is
only the persons who share this essence who can be affected. The Father, not
the divine essence, so loved the world that he gave his Son and turned away
from the sin-bearing Savior of sinners in wrath and judgment. Love is an
attribute of the divine essence (“God is
love”
[1Jn 4:8, 16]), but only the divine persons love (verb).
第三，我們必須再次認識到，神向我們說話，是以適合我們理解、而不是適合祂的存有的用語。正如開放神論要求在真正的關係中，神必須要倚靠世界，它同樣傾向於把聖經中神的感情的表達，視為與人類的情感完全等同的。重複較早時的一點，神自由地決定進入受造之物的歷史，從來都不會威脅祂本質上的超越性。神即使在接近我們時，也總是「他者」。神分享和分擔祂百姓的喜與悲，但祂從不被沮喪懾服（我會在330頁根據范浩沙進一步闡述這一點）。神是聖約之主，當人違背神的約時，祂是忌邪的、甚至是充滿忿怒的，但祂從不被情感懾服。例如；祂的忿怒總是與公義一致。神的審判是從不草率的，這對那些應該承受祂的忿怒的人來說是好消息：「我必不發猛烈的怒氣，也不再毀滅以法蓮。因我是神，並非世人，是你們中間的聖者；我必不在怒中臨到你們」（何十一9；參：瑪三6）。聖經一再告訴我們，神是長久忍耐、不輕易發怒的。但有時祂的忿怒會被激起（支持神和人的感覺完全相同的這個論證，很少把祂的愛也包括進來）。例如在詩篇二篇12節，神警告說：「當以嘴親子，恐怕他發怒，你們便在道中滅亡，因為他的怒氣快要發作」（強調字體為引者標明）。神不是很容易亂發脾氣的、反覆無常的暴君；反而，那些已經被神公平地定罪的人能夠繼續呼吸，僅僅是出於神的憐憫。在所有這些特點中，神都在本質上與受造物不同。Third, we must
again recognize that God speaks to us in terms adequate to our understanding
rather than adequate to his being. Just as open theism requires God’s dependence on the world for genuine
relationship, it tends to treat expressions of divine pathos in Scripture as
univocal with human emotions. To repeat an earlier point, God’s free decision
to enter into creaturely history never threatens his essential transcendence.
God is always “other” even when he is near. God shares in the joys and sorrows
of his people, but he is never overwhelmed by distress (I develop this point
further, in dependence on Vanhoozer, on p. 252). As the Covenant Lord, God is
jealous and even filled with wrath when his covenant is violated, but is never
overwhelmed by emotion. His anger is always consistent with justice, for
example. God is never rash in his judgments, and this is good news for those
who deserve his wrath: “I will not execute my fierce anger; I will not again
destroy
Ephraim; for I am God and no mortal, the Holy One in your midst, and I will not
come in wrath” (Hos 11:9 NRSV; cf. Mal 3:6). And Scripture tells us repeatedly
that God is longsuffering and slow to anger. Yet sometimes his wrath is aroused
(something that arguments in favor of a univocal relation between divine and
human feeling rarely include along with his love). In Psalm 2:12, for instance,
God warns, “Kiss the Son, lest he become angry and you perish in the way, for
his wrath is quickly kindled” (emphasis added). God is not a capricious tyrant
whose tempers are easily flared; rather, those who are already under God’s just
condemnation continue to draw their breath only because of God’s mercy. In all
of these characteristics, God is qualitatively different from creatures.
將人的特質歸給神的本質，這動機是那麼具決定性，以致好像莫特曼和潘嘉樂這樣的神學家甚至猜測，神哭泣時會流下真的眼淚。[31] 潘嘉樂引述摩門教神學家鮑爾森（David Paulsen）和其他人來挑戰神的靈性。[32] 如果採納這個前設，說無限的屬性總是異教的扭曲，人們甚至可以設想放棄耶穌所說的「神是靈」（約四24）的這個主張，視之為希臘哲學的另一個入侵。這個危險強調了一點，即企圖將神從天上帶下來、或自己升上天上的任何嘗試，都只是一個硬幣不同的兩面：馴化超越的神，把創造者和受造物混為一談。路德警告說，所有榮耀神學的核心，都是渴望升到神那裏，並除去祂自己選擇的面具，以致我們不再受限於祂的背，也可以看祂內在的本質─祂的臉，那使人失明的榮耀。The motivation to
attribute human characteristics to God’s
essence is so determinative that theologians such as Moltmann and Pinnock even
speculate that God cries real tears.77 Pinnock cites Mormon theologian David
Paulsen, among others, to challenge God’s spirituality.78 Adopting the
presupposition that attributes of infinitude are always pagan distortions, one
could even conceivably surrender Jesus’ assertion that “God is spirit” (Jn
4:24) as one more incursion of Greek philosophy. This danger underscores the
point that any attempt to bring God down from heaven or to rise up to God is
merely a different side of the same coin: domesticating the transcendent God,
confusing the Creator with the creature. At the heart of all theologies of
glory, Luther warned, is the desire to ascend to God and strip off his
self-chosen masks so that we are no longer restricted to his back but can
behold his inner essence — the blinding glory of his face.
神有三個位格，卻是一位神，同享至高無上的主權、良善和其他屬性；這三個位格對此深具信心，雖然充分意識到會有人類失敗、叛逆和暴力的歷史，卻仍自由地與受造之物建立關係。永恆的救贖之約是這事實最清楚的證據。但神的三個位格向這悲劇開放，正是因為這三個位格能夠共同克服它。對於迥別於我們的神來說，這信心不是可能或甚至很可能，而是肯定。Confident in the
sovereignty, goodness, and other attributes that they share as the one God, the
persons of the Godhead enter freely into relationships with creatures in the
full awareness that there will be a history of human failure, rebellion, and
violence. The eternal covenant of redemption is the clearest evidence of this
fact. Yet the divine persons open themselves up to this tragedy precisely
because together they will overcome it. For God, unlike us, this confidence is
not a possibility or even a probability but a certainty.
聖經清楚描繪，神格的三位格都參與聖約的關係，在其中有真正的施予和領受。神喜悅、忿怒和產生憐憫，也施行審判。但在所有這些情況下，我們都不能說神好像我們那樣經驗事物。甚至人類的罪也在神終極的控制之下。神可以冒這種「風險」，因為祂按祂最終的旨意，叫萬事互相效力、帶來益處的能力是永不失敗的（羅八28）。從神永恆諭旨的角度看，這些完全不是風險─不是因為神不受人類的失敗觸動，而是因為祂從不被懾服，祂隱密的目的最終也不會受挫敗。但從神與我們正在開展的聖約歷史的角度看，雙方都涉及風險。在這一點，恰當的行動不是把任何一個角度等同於「實際是怎樣」相對於「我們看來是怎樣」，而是接受兩者為類比的真理，因為兩者都是神已經在聖經中向我們啟示的。Scripture clearly
represents the persons of the Godhead as involved in a covenantal relationship
in which there is genuine give-and-take. God is pleased, angered, aroused to
compassion and also to judgment. Yet in none of these cases can we conclude
that God experiences things as we do. Even human sin is under God’s ultimate
control. God can take such “risks” because he is unfailing in his ability to
work all things together for good according to his ultimate purposes (Ro 8:28).
From the perspective of God’s eternal decree, they are not risks at all — not
because God is untouched by human failure but because he is never overwhelmed
nor are his secret purposes ultimately thwarted. Yet from the perspective of
God’s unfolding covenantal history with us, there are risks involved on both
sides. At this point, the appropriate move is not to identify either
perspective with “how it really is” versus “how it seems to us,” but to embrace
both as analogical truth insofar as God has revealed it to us in Scripture.
聖經類比的多樣化，使我們不致屈從於對單一的屬性作偶像崇拜似的凝視。我們不敬拜愛，而是敬拜慈愛的神；我們也不敬拜那至高無上的主權，而是敬拜那擁有至高無上主權的神。可以肯定的是，這種辯證式地使用類比，可以比作以敘事手法來描繪神在後悔，卻肯定祂迥非人，不會為自己的決定後悔（撒上十五29）。不過，我們不能夠在這種想法上面停留太久，把俯就的溝通轉化成一種偶像崇拜。將忌邪（字面的意思是嫉妒）用在神身上，是應該讚美的（出二十5，三十四14；申四24），但若用在受造物身上，卻是應該受到譴責的（林前三3；加五20），因此，很明顯，將忌邪（嫉妒）用在神和受造物身上，不可能是同一個意思。神被描述為「在怒氣、忿怒、大惱恨中」將以色列人從本地拔出來（申二十九28）；但「祂的怒氣不過是轉眼之間；祂的恩典乃是一生之久」（詩三十5）。The diversity of biblical
analogies keeps us from being surrendered to an idolatrous gaze upon a single
attribute. We do not worship love, but the loving God; nor do we worship
sovereignty, but the sovereign God. Surely the dialectic play of analogies is
comparable to the narrative representation of God as regretting and yet
affirming that he is not a man that he should regret his decision (1Sa 15:29).
We are not allowed to linger long, transforming accommodated communication to a
form of idolatry. Jealousy is praised in God (Ex 20:5; 34:14; Dt 4:24), while
it is condemned in creatures (1Co 3:3; Gal 5:20), so clearly jealousy cannot
mean exactly the same thing in God and creatures. God is described as uprooting
the Israelites “in anger and fury and great wrath” (Dt 29:28), and yet “his
anger is but for a moment, and his favor is for a lifetime” (Ps 30:5).
所有這些多樣化的類比，都必須在它們特定的救贖歷史脈絡中認真地考慮，然後根據聖經的其餘部分來詮釋。我們裏面受神譴責的怒氣（箴二十九11、22，二十二24；林前十三5），和以神聖的怒氣充滿祂的震怒不同，無論兩者之間有甚麼相似之處。那些肯定聖經正典的統一、連貫和真實的人，無法滿足於用一種理論來解釋「痛感」的經文或「無痛感」的經文，而會在類比的教義中找到一種方式，在廣闊、深厚、豐富和有時令人困擾之擴充的啟示中，接受神俯就的論述。All of these
diverse analogies must be taken seriously within their specific
redemptive-historical context and then interpreted in the light of the rest of
Scripture. The anger that God condemns in us (Pr 29:11, 22; 22:24; 1Co 13:5) is
different from the anger that fills him with holy wrath, whatever similarities
there may be. Those who affirm the unity, coherence, and truthfulness of the
biblical canon cannot be content with a theory that accounts for “passibility”
passages or “impassibility” passages, but will find in the doctrine of analogy
a way of accepting God’s accommodated discourse across the wide, deep,
luxuriant, and sometimes troubling expanse of revelation.
第四，基督信仰中關乎神的教義，必須以互動溝通的類比補充因果關係的類比，前者更符合聖經本身為神的行動性言說（per- formative
speech）所作的見證。雖然傳統基督教神學，鮮明地區分它的觀點與亞里斯多德之不動的推動者（Unmoved Mover），但我同意范浩沙的見解，因果關係的類比佔據主導地位往往加重了這種嘲諷，而溝通的類比則為談論神與世界交往提供了更好的方法。[33] 范浩沙將神的無痛感與耶穌的無瑕疵（不能犯罪）作比較，藉以說明這一點：Fourth, a Christian
doctrine of God must supplement causal with communicative analogies that are
more in keeping with Scripture’s own testimony to God’s performative speech.
Although traditional Christian theology has sharply distinguished its views
from Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover, I agree with Vanhoozer that the
dominance
of causal categories often perpetuates that caricature, and that communicative
categories offer a better way of speaking about God’s interaction with the
world.79 Vanhoozer makes this point by comparing God’s impassibility to Jesus’
impeccability (inability to sin):
耶穌無罪但受到真正的試探，正如戰無不勝的軍隊受到攻擊一樣。我相信，我們也可以用類似的話來說神的無痛感。……神感受到祂百姓苦難的力度：「我的百姓在埃及所受的困苦，我實在看見了；他們因受督工的轄制所發的哀聲，我也聽見了。我原知道他們的痛苦」（出三7）。但正如耶穌感到試探的力度，但卻沒有犯罪，神感到人類經驗的力度，但祂的存有、旨意或知識卻沒有改變。無痛感並非表示神沒有感覺，而是神從不被激情征服或懾服。……神真的透過祂互動溝通的行動與人交往，但人所做的都不能制約或影響神在互動溝通上的主動和神互動溝通的作為。[34] Jesus was
sinless yet subject to real temptation in the same way that an invincible army
is subject to attack. Something similar, I believe, may be said for divine
impassibility…. God feels the force of his people’s suffering: “I have seen the
affliction of my people who are in Egypt, and have heard their cry because of
their taskmasters; I know their sufferings” (Ex 3:7). Yet as Jesus feels the
force of temptation without sinning, so God feels the force of the human
experience without suffering change in his being, will or knowledge.
Impassibility means not that God is unfeeling but that God is never overcome or
overwhelmed by passion…. God genuinely relates to human persons via his
communicative action, but nothing humans do conditions or affects God’s communicative
initiatives and God’s communicative acts.80
邪惡和罪也被放在神永恆的諭旨中來理解；因此，甚至這些都不能說是制約神的旨意或行動。而且，范浩沙是從三一論來建構這論證的：「子和聖靈是父互動溝通行動的管道。」[35] Evil and sin
are also comprehended in God’s eternal decree;
therefore, not even these can be said to condition God’s will or acts. Further, Vanhoozer’s construction of this argument is Trinitarian:
“the Son and Spirit are means of the Father’s communicative action. 81
第五，我們必須提防容讓十架神學變成榮耀哲學。按照新黑格爾的神義論，拿撒勒人耶穌這個特定的人，以及祂達成的特定歷史，都很容易屈從於一個一般原則。根頓論及這些表述時指出，「它們的主要缺點是將基督變成一種普世原則，以拿撒勒人耶穌為代價，並且把祂的十字架當作神受苦的焦點，而不是當作神勝過罪和邪惡之歷史的中心。」這樣將三一神和代贖分離的結果，就失去了基督信仰的三一論，而且是「不加批判地確認現代文化的效力」。[36] 在這個架構中，神將所有苦難帶到祂自己的存有裏。「對此的反對是清晰的。將某些東西吸收進神的生命中，就是在肯定它，從而否定基督信仰的中心特性就是救贖性的宗教，在其中，邪惡不是得到肯定，而是在拿撒勒人耶穌的十字架和復活中被征服（按末世論的角度說，並具有前瞻的作用）。」[37] Fifth, we must
beware of allowing a theology of the cross to become a philosophy of glory. In
neo-Hegelian theodicies, the particular person, Jesus of Nazareth, and the particular
history in which he arrives are easily surrendered to a general principle.
Colin Gunton points out concerning these formulations, “Their chief defect is
that they turn Christ into a world principle at the expense of Jesus of
Nazareth, and treat his cross as a focus for the suffering of God rather than
as the centre of that history in which God overcomes sin and evil.” The result
of this separation of Trinity from atonement is the loss of the Christian
Trinity and “an uncritical validation of modern culture.”82 In this scheme, God
takes into his own being all suffering. “The objection to this is clear. To
incorporate something into the divine life is to affirm it, and so to deny the
central character of Christianity as a religion of redemption, in which evil is
not affirmed but conquered, eschatologically and by anticipation, in the cross
and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth.”83
在十字架上，神不是肯定死亡和受苦，反而是征服它們。祂沒有把邪惡轉化為良善，而是永遠消滅邪惡。正因為苦難不是內蘊於神的存有，祂可以、也必將實現祂對受苦百姓的應許：祂「要擦去他們一切的眼淚；不再有死亡，也不再有悲哀、哭號、疼痛，因為以前的事都過去了」（啟二十一4）。只有神能在那日擦去我們的眼淚，因為祂不能被苦難懾服。祂行動，是出於全能、全知和全面的愛，而不是出於永恆的受苦。At the cross, God
did not affirm death and suffering; rather, he conquered it. He did not
transform evil into good but vanquished evil forever. Precisely because
suffering is not immanent to God’s being, he can and will fulfill his promise
to his suffering people that he “will wipe away every tear from their eyes, and
death shall be no more, neither shall there be mourning, nor crying, nor pain
anymore, for the former things have passed away” (Rev 21:4). Only God can wipe
away our tears on that day, because he cannot be overwhelmed by suffering. He
acts out of omnipotent, omniscient, and all-wise love, not out of eternal
suffering.
由於很多批評無痛感的人將這教義的持續影響，連繫到老普林斯頓（編按：指1930年代以前的普林斯頓神學院）的傳統，在結束我們對這屬性的研究時，值得詳細引述「普林斯頓之獅」華腓德的話。華腓德說，絕對精神（the Absolute）的哲學家告訴我們，「出於祂本性的必須，神不能受影響，不能被外在的誘因所推動；祂住在聖潔的安靜和不變的幸福中，永遠不受人類的苦難或人類的哀傷觸及。」Since many critics
of impassibility associate the lingering influence of this doctrine with the
tradition of Old Princeton, it is worth concluding our consideration of his
attribute with a lengthy quote from the “lion of Princeton,” B. B. Warfield.
Philosophers of the Absolute tell us, Warfield says, “that God is, by the very
necessity of his nature, incapable of passion, incapable of being moved by
inducements from without; that he dwells in holy calm and unchangeable
blessedness, untouched by human sufferings or human sorrows for ever.”
華腓德回答這個主張：Warfield replies to this
contention:
那不是真的；讓我們為此感謝神。神可以感覺；神確實愛。我們有聖經的保證相信……神已然伸出慈愛的臂彎，將那一大束本來刺穿我們的矛收集到祂自己的胸膛中。但這不是十足的擬人法嗎？我們不在乎名稱；那是神的真理。我們不願將聖經的神和我們心裏的神交給任何哲學的抽象概念。……我們在絕對精神的同在下可能感到敬畏，正如我們在風暴或地震下可能感到敬畏一樣；……但我們不能愛它，我們不能信任它。……不過，讓我們歡欣，因為我們的神沒有讓我們靠百般尋索來找到祂。讓我們歡欣，祂清楚地在自己的聖道中向我們啟示祂自己：祂是愛我們的神，祂因為愛我們，為我們犧牲自己。[38] Let us bless
God that it is not true. God can feel; God does love. We have scriptural
warrant for believing that … God has reached
out loving arms and gathered into his own bosom that forest of spears which
otherwise had pierced ours. But is not this gross anthropomorphism? We are
careless of names: it is the truth of God. And we decline to yield up the God
of the Bible and the God of our hearts to any philosophical abstraction…. We
may feel awe in the presence of the Absolute, as we feel awe in the presence of
the storm or of the earthquake… But we cannot love it; we cannot trust it….
Nevertheless, let us rejoice that our God has not left us by searching to find
him out. Let us rejoice that he has plainly revealed himself to us in his Word
as a God who loves us, and who, because he loves us, has sacrificed himself for
us.84
雖然父、子和聖靈的共同本質沒有受苦，卻向一個與自由的受造物建立的聖約關係敞開自己。父、子和聖靈受世界影響，但不是像我們那樣受影響，因為祂們的位格不是我們的那種位格。Although their
common essence does not suffer, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit open
themselves up to a covenantal relationship with free creatures. Affected by the
world, they are not affected in the same way as we are because they are not the
kinds of persons that we are.
[1] 關於古代神學家怎樣重新定義無痛感，一篇中肯的文章，見David Bentley Hart,
“No Shadow of Turning: On Divine Impassibility,” Pro Ecclesia 11, no. 2 (2002): 184-206。
[2]
Gerald Bray, The Doctrine of God (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press,
1993), 98。開放神論者和其他批評無痛感的人，混淆了神不能成為被動的受害人，和沒有能力（以忿怒或憐憫）向受造物展示感情或回應。當然，從聖經的證據，這個立場不難反駁。不過，這是基本上誤解了無痛感在基督教思想的廣闊歷史上的意思。例如：《威斯敏斯特信仰告白》說神是「沒有四肢或情慾」，但即使在英語，對這份信仰告白的作者來說，passions的意思也與它的希臘語和拉丁語的來源一致（也就是不能控制的忿怒或愚昧）。古德恩（Wayne Grudem）在這點上批評信仰告白的教導，認為這排除了神表達情感的可能性（Systematic Theology
[Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994], 165-66＝張麟至譯，《系統神學》〔E. Brunswick：更新傳道會，2011〕，142-43頁）時，即忽略了這一點。關於這個誤解，古德恩總結說：「然而，若說神完全無欲無情，這種看法就顯然與別處的許多經文相衝突；為此緣故，筆者在這本書裏不能完全確認神的無痛感性」（166；中譯，143頁）。赫爾姆（Paul Helm）指出，甚至阿奎那也容許神和受造物一樣（類比地）擁有情感的特點，除了任何要求神必須是被動和暫時的特點之外（“The Impossibility
of Divine Passibility,” in The Power and
Weakness of God: Impas– sibility and
Orthodoxy [ed. Nigel M.S. Cameron: Edinburgh: Rutherford House, 1990], 126）。
[3]
John Milbank, Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon (New York: Routledge,
2003), 49-62。
[4]
Kevin J. Vanhoozer, First Theology: God, Scripture and Hermeneutics (Downers
Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2002), 74。
[5]
T. E. Fretheim, The Suffering of God: And Old Testament Perspective (Phila-
delphia: Fortress, 1984) 在聖經神學研究中有模塑作用，而 Brueg- gemann,
Theology of the Old Testament 闡述將神高度擬人化的觀念。從聖經神學角度很好地對比（和批評）這些觀點的是Brevard Childs,
Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments: Theological Reflection on the
Christian Bible (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993)。
[6] Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God (New York:
Harper & Row, 1974)＝莫爾特曼著，阮煒譯，《被釘十字架的上帝》（香港：道風書社，1994）；The Trinity and the Kingdom:
The Doctrine of God (trans. Margaret Kohl; San Francisco: Harper & Row,
1981)＝莫爾特曼著，周偉馳譯，《三一與上帝國：論神的教義》（香港：道風書社，2007）。
[7]
Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, 21＝莫爾特曼著，《三一與上帝國：論神的教義》，33-34頁。混淆不變性和不動性，莫特曼也混淆無痛感和無力感受或回應受造之物的痛苦。我們已經看到，這是當代批評中一再出現的「稻草人對手」。
[8] 同上，23＝莫爾特曼著，《三一與上帝國：論神的教義》，37頁。
[9] 同上，27＝莫爾特曼著，《三一與上帝國：論神的教義》，41-42頁。「賀契爾根據猶太人對神的經驗，建立一種聖約的兩極神學（bipolar theology）。神在本身是自由的，不受任何命運支配；但透過祂的痛苦，神同時委身於約中。祂是萬神之神；同時對祂的小小的以色列百姓來說，祂是聖約的神。祂在天上統治，同時卻與謙卑及溫柔的人同住。」不過，信仰正統肯定這點（正如上面解釋），而莫特曼（和賀契爾不同）只是將神的本質和行為的任何區分壓縮在一起。
[10] 同上，28＝莫爾特曼著，《三一與上帝國：論神的教義》，42-43頁。
[11] 同上，31＝莫爾特曼著，《三一與上帝國：論神的教義》，47頁。
[12] 同上，32＝莫爾特曼著，《三一與上帝國：論神的教義》，49頁。
[13] 同上。
[14] 同上＝莫爾特曼著，《三一與上帝國：論神的教義》，50-51頁。
[15] 同上＝莫爾特曼著，《三一與上帝國：論神的教義》，51頁。
[16] 同上，34＝莫爾特曼著，《三一與上帝國：論神的教義》，51頁。
[17] 同上，35＝莫爾特曼著，《三一與上帝國：論神的教義》，54頁。Geoffrey A. Studdert Kennedy, The Hardest Part
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1918) 與巴特的《羅馬書釋義》（Moltmann,Epistle to the Romans）同時出現，卻更受注意。莫特曼判斷說：「事實上，它比巴特的書更值得留意，因為受苦之神的神學比『全然他者』之神的神學更重要」（The Trinity and the
Kingdom, 35＝莫爾特曼著，《三一與上帝國：論神的教義》，53頁）。
[18]
Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, 42＝莫爾特曼著，《三一與上帝國：論神的教義》，62頁：烏納穆諾總結說，受苦和神的悲傷「不單是神的世界的矛盾」。「它與那連繫在一起；但也是神自己裏面的矛盾。……〔烏納穆諾〕滿足於指向伯默的神有『黑暗一面』這個觀念。」伯默的猜測似乎特別透過謝林傳給莫特曼。參F. Schelling, The
Ages of the World (trans. Jason M. Wirth; Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 2000)。
[19] 同上，45＝莫爾特曼著，《三一與上帝國：論神的教義》，68-69頁。如同很多當代神學家，莫特曼似乎不明白傳統神學在這幾點上的微妙之處。從聖經頗容易證明神感動人，也受感動（例如憐憫、忿怒等）。不過，問題仍然必須處理：這是指神的本質還是神的能量？指本質還是位格？（根據定義，本質不感動人，也不受感動：「本質」─至少在亞里斯多德和基督教神學─只表示有可斷定的品質的東西。即使我受感動而傷心，那不是我的人性受感動，而是我身為人受感動。）最後，這種語言（如同神所有的自我啟示）是類比的還是單義的？莫特曼從沒有處理這些重要的問題，但將所有這些區別連在一起，得出簡化的結論：「任何人否認神聖本性中有運動，也否認神聖三一。而否認這點實際上是否認整個基督信仰。」
[20] 同上，39＝莫爾特曼著，《三一與上帝國：論神的教義》，60-61頁。
[21] 同上，40＝莫爾特曼著，《三一與上帝國：論神的教義》，61頁。莫特曼從烏納穆諾論述站在委拉斯蓋茲（Velázquez，西班牙畫家）的十字架下得到這個問題，他稱這問題為「達到極為大膽之界限的觀念」。
[22] 同上，46＝莫爾特曼著，《三一與上帝國：論神的教義》，70頁。附帶一提，詹森提出類似的動作，視十字架為勾消現實的「黑暗面」（本體論的錯誤），而不是為罪代贖（倫理的錯誤）。我再次提到亨欣格的具體批評：George Hunsinger, “Robert Jenson’s Systematic Theology”，特別是161-65。
[23] 同上，47＝莫爾特曼著，《三一與上帝國：論神的教義》，71頁。
[24] 同上。
[25] 同上，70＝莫爾特曼著，《三一與上帝國：論神的教義》，104頁。
[26]
David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian
Truth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 160。
[27]
Vanhoozer, First Theology, 88。
[28] 同上，89-90。
[29] 同上，90。
[30] 關於這點，見Thomas Weinandy, Does God
Suffer? (South Bend, Ind.: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 113-46; Thomas
Weinandy, ed., Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction (Edinburgh: T&T
Clark, 2004), 75-79；參：David B. Burrell,
Aquinas: God and Action (South Bend, Ind.: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1979),
84-87。
[31]
Moltmann, The Crucified God, 222＝莫爾特曼著，《被釘十字架的上帝》；Pinnock, Most Moved
Mover, 33-34。
[32]
Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, 35n31和68n11。
[33]
Vanhoozer, First Theology, 88。
[34] 同上，93。
[35] 同上，94。
[36]
Colin Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
1997), xx。
[37] 同上，xxi。
[38]
B. B. Warfield, The Person and Work of Christ (ed. Samuel G. Craig;
Philadelphia: P&R, 1970), 570-71。
