United States StrategicApproach to The People’s Republic of China美國對中華人民共和國的戰略方針
Introduction
介紹
Since
the United States and the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) established diplomatic relations in 1979, United States policy toward the
PRC was largely premised on a hope that deepening engagement would spur
fundamental economic and political opening in the PRC and lead to its emergence
as a constructive and responsible global stakeholder, with a more open
society. More than 40 years later, it
has become evident that this approach underestimated the will of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) to constrain the scope of economic and political reform
in China. Over the past two decades,
reforms have slowed, stalled, or reversed.
The PRC’s rapid economic development and increased engagement with the
world did not lead to convergence with the citizen-centric, free and open order
as the United States had hoped. The CCP
has chosen instead to exploit the free and open rules based order and attempt
to reshape the international system in its favor. Beijing openly acknowledges that it seeks to
transform the international order to align with CCP interests and
ideology. The CCP’s expanding use of
economic, political, and military power to compel acquiescence from nation
states harms vital American interests and undermines the sovereignty and
dignity of countries and individuals around the world.
自 1979 年美國和中華人民共和國建立外交關係以來，美國的對華政策在很大程度上是基 於這樣一種，即通過深化接觸刺激中華人民共和國的經濟和政治開放，使其成為一個有建 設性的、負責任的全球利益相關者，並建立一個更加開放的社會。 40 多年後的今天，這 種做法顯然低估了中國共產黨（中共）制約中國經濟和政治改革範圍的意願。 在過去的 20 年裡，改革的步伐已經放緩、停滯甚至倒退。 中華人民共和國經濟的快速發展和與世 界接觸的增多並沒有像美國所希望的那樣，與以公民為中心的自由開放秩序相接軌。 相 反，中共選擇了利用自由開放的規則秩序，試圖重塑有利於自己的國際體系。 北京公開 承認其試圖改造國際秩序並使之符合中共的利益和意識形態。 中共不斷擴大利用經濟、 政治和軍事力量迫使民族國家默許，損害了美國的重大利益，損害了世界各國和人民的主 權和尊嚴。
To
respond to Beijing’s challenge, the
Administration has adopted a competitive approach to the PRC, based on a
clear-eyed assessment of the CCP’s intentions and actions, a reappraisal of the
United States’ many strategic advantages and shortfalls, and a tolerance of
greater bilateral friction. Our approach
is not premised on determining a particular end state for China. Rather, our goal is to protect United States
vital national interests, as articulated in the four pillars of the 2017
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS). We aim to:
(1) protect the American people, homeland, and way of life; (2) promote
American prosperity; (3) preserve peace through strength; and (4) advance
American influence.
為了應對北京的挑戰，美國政府對中華人民共和國採取了一種競爭性的方式，其基礎是對 中共的意圖和行動的清晰評估，對美國的許多戰略優勢和不足的重新評估，以及對更大雙 邊摩擦的容忍。 我們的做法並不是以確定中國的某一個特定的最終狀態為前提。 相反， 我們的目標是保護美國的重要國家利益，正如 2017 年美國國家安全戰略（NSS）的四大 支柱所闡述的那樣。 我們的目標是： (1)保護美國人民、家園和生活方式；(2)促進美國的 繁榮；(3)通過實力維護和平；(4)提升美國的影響力。
Our
competitive approach to the PRC has two objectives: first, to improve the resiliency of our
institutions, alliances, and partnerships to prevail against the challenges the
PRC presents; and second, to compel Beijing to cease or reduce actions harmful
to the United States’ vital, national interests and those of our allies and
partners. Even as we compete with the
PRC, we welcome cooperation where our interests align. Competition need not lead to confrontation or
conflict. The United States has a deep
and abiding respect for the Chinese people and enjoys longstanding ties to the
country. We do not seek to contain
China’s development, nor do we wish to disengage from the Chinese people. The United States expects to engage in fair
competition with the PRC, whereby both of our nations, businesses, and
individuals can enjoy security and prosperity.
我們對中華人民共和國採取的競爭性方式有兩個目標：第一，提高我們的機構、聯盟和夥 伴關係的應變能力，以應對中華人民共和國提出的挑戰；第二，迫使北京停止或減少有損 於美國以及我們的盟國和夥伴的重要國家利益的行動。 即使在我們與中華人民共和國競 爭的同時，我們也歡迎在我們的利益一致的方面進行合作。 競爭不一定會導致對抗或衝 突，美國對中國人民有著深厚而持久的尊重，與中國有著長期的聯繫。 我們不謀求遏制 中國的發展，也不希望脫離中國人民。美國期望與中華人民共和國進行公平競爭，使我們 的國家、企業和個人都能享有安全和繁榮。
Prevailing
in strategic competition with the PRC requires cooperative engagement with
multiple stakeholders, and the Administration is committed to building
partnerships to protect our shared interests and values. Vital partners of this Administration include
the Congress, state and local governments, the private sector, civil society,
and academia. The Congress has been
speaking out through hearings, statements, and reports that shed light on the
CCP’s malign behavior. The Congress also
provides legal authorities and resources for the United States Government to
take the actions to achieve our strategic objectives. The Administration also recognizes the steps
allies and partners have taken to develop more clear-eyed and robust approaches
toward the PRC, including the European Union’s publication in March 2019 of
EU-China: A Strategic Outlook, among
others.
要在與中華人民共和國的戰略競爭中取勝，需要與多個利益相關方合作，政府致力於建立 夥伴關係，保護我們的共同利益和價值觀。 本屆政府的重要合作夥伴包括國會、州和地 方政府、私營部門、民間社會和學術界。 國會一直在通過聽證會、聲明和報告來揭露中 共的惡行。 國會還為美國政府提供了法律授權和資源以便美國政府採取行動來實現我們的戰略目標。 美國政府還肯定了盟友和夥伴們為制定更清晰、更有力的針對中華人民共 和國方針而採取的措施，包括歐盟在 2019年
3月出版的《歐盟-中國：戰略展望》（EUChina: a Strategic
Outlook）等。
The
United States is also building cooperative partnerships and developing positive
alternatives with foreign allies, partners, and international organizations to
support the shared principles of a free and open order. Specific to the Indo-Pacific region, many of
these initiatives are described in documents such as the Department of Defense
June 2019 IndoPacific Strategy Report and the Department of State November 2019
report on A Free and Open Indo-Pacific:
Advancing a Shared Vision. The
United States is working in concert with mutually aligned visions and
approaches such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nation’s Outlook on the
Indo-Pacific, Japan’s free and open Indo-Pacific vision, India’s Security and
Growth for All in the Region policy, Australia’s Indo-Pacific concept, the
Republic of Korea’s New Southern Policy, and Taiwan’s New Southbound
Policy.
美國還在與外國盟友、夥伴和國際組織建立合作夥伴關係，發展積極的替代方案，以支持 自由開放秩序的共同原則。 具體到印太地區，其中許多舉措在美國國防部 2019年 6月的 《印太戰略報告》和美國國務院 2019年
11月的《自由開放的印太戰略報告-推進共同願 景》等檔中都有介紹。美國正在與東南亞國家聯盟的印太展望、日本的自由開放的印太願 景、印度的 區域安全與增長政策、澳大利亞的 印太概念、韓國的新南方政策、臺灣的 " 新南向政策 "等相互一致的願景和做法進行合作。
This
report does not attempt to detail the comprehensive range of actions and policy
initiatives the Administration is carrying out across the globe as part of our
strategic competition. Rather, this
report focuses on the implementation of the NSS as it applies most directly to
the PRC.
本報告並不試圖詳細介紹政府作為戰略競爭的一部分，在全球範圍內開展的全面行動和政 策措施。 相反，本報告將重點介紹美國國家安全戰略的實施情況，因為它最直接適用於 中華人民共和國。
Challenges
挑戰
The PRC today poses numerous challenges to
United States national interests. 今天的中華人民共和國對美國的國家利益構成了諸多挑戰。
1.
Economic Challenges
1. 經濟挑戰
Beijing’s
poor record of following through on economic reform commitments and its
extensive use of state-driven protectionist policies and practices harm United
States companies and workers, distort global markets, violate international
norms, and pollute the environment. When
the PRC acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, Beijing agreed
to embrace the WTO’s open market-oriented approach and embed these principles
in its trading system and institutions.
WTO members expected China to continue on its path of economic reform
and transform itself into a market-oriented economy and trade regime.
北京在履行經濟改革承諾方面的不良記錄以及廣泛採用國家主導的保護主義政策和做法， 損害了美國公司和工人的利益，扭曲了全球市場，違反了國際準則，並污染了環境。 中 華人民共和國在 2001年加入世界貿易組織（WTO）時，中國政府同意接受 WTO的開放 市場導向方針，並將這些原則納入其貿易體系和機構中。 世貿組織成員希望中國繼續走 經濟改革的道路，向市場化的經濟體制和貿易體制轉型。
These
hopes were not realized. Beijing did not
internalize the norms and practices of competitionbased trade and investment,
and instead exploited the benefits of WTO membership to become the world’s
largest exporter, while systematically protecting its domestic markets. Beijing’s economic policies have led to massive
industrial overcapacity that distorts global prices and allows China to expand
global market share at the expense of competitors operating without the unfair
advantages that Beijing provides to its firms.
The PRC retains its non-market economic structure and stateled,
mercantilist approach to trade and investment.
Political reforms have likewise atrophied and gone into reverse, and
distinctions between the government and the party are eroding. General Secretary Xi’s decision to remove
presidential term limits, effectively extending his tenure indefinitely,
epitomized these trends.
這些希望並沒有實現。 北京沒有將基於競爭的貿易和投資的規範和做法內部化，而是利 用加入世貿組織的好處，成為世界上最大的出口國，同時有計劃地保護其國內市場。 北 京的經濟政策導致了大規模的工業產能過剩，扭曲了全球價格，使中國能夠以犧牲那些沒 有北京為其提供的不公平的優勢的競爭對手的利益為代價擴大全球市場份額。 中華人民 共和國保留了非市場經濟結構和國家主導的重商主義貿易和投資方式。 政治改革也同樣 一直在萎縮和倒退，政府和黨的區別正在被侵蝕。 習總書記關於取消總統任期限制的決 定實際上是無限期地延長了其總統任期，而這只是這些趨勢的一個縮影。
In
his 2018 Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology
Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) determined that
numerous acts, policies, and practices of the PRC government were unreasonable
or discriminatory, and burden or restrict United States commerce. Based on a rigorous investigation, USTR found
that the PRC: (1) requires or pressures
United States companies to transfer their technology to Chinese entities; (2)
places substantial restrictions on United States companies’ ability to license
their technology on market terms; (3) directs and unfairly facilitates
acquisition of United States companies and assets by domestic firms to obtain
cutting edge technologies; and (4) conducts and supports unauthorized cyber
intrusions into United States companies’ networks to access sensitive
information and trade secrets.
美國貿易代表（USTR）在其 2018 年對中國根據 1974 年《貿易法》第 301 條對中國有關 技術轉讓、智慧財產權和創新的行為、政策和做法的調查結論中，認定中華人民共和國政 府的許多行為、政策和做法是不合理的或歧視性的，給美國的商業帶來了負擔或限制。 根據嚴格的調查，USTR 發現，中華人民共和國：(1)要求或迫使美國公司向中國實體轉讓 其技術；(2)對美國公司按市場條件許可其技術的能力施加實質性的限制；(3)指導和不公 平地協助國內公司收購美國公司和資產，以獲得尖端技術；(4)對美國公司的網路進行和 支援未經授權的網路入侵，以獲取敏感資訊和商業機密。
The
list of Beijing’s commitments to
cease its predatory economic practices is littered with broken and empty
promises. In 2015, Beijing promised that
it would stop government directed cyberenabled theft of trade secrets for commercial
gain, reiterating that same promise in 2017 and 2018. Later in 2018, the United States and a dozen
other countries attributed global computer intrusion campaigns, targeting
intellectual property and confidential business information, to operators
affiliated with the PRC’s Ministry of State Security – a contravention of
Beijing’s 2015 commitment. Since the
1980s, Beijing has signed multiple international agreements to protect
intellectual property. Despite this,
more than 63 percent of the world’s counterfeits originate in China, inflicting
hundreds of billions of dollars of damage on legitimate businesses around the
world.
在北京停止掠奪性經濟行為的承諾清單上，充斥著許多背棄和空洞的承諾。 2015 年，北 京承諾將停止由政府主導的網路竊取商業秘密以獲取商業利益的行為，2017 年和 2018 年 又重申了同樣的承諾。 2018 年晚些時候，美國和其他十幾個國家將針對智慧財產權和商 業機密資訊的全球電腦入侵活動歸咎於與中華人民共和國國家安全部有關聯的運營商，這 違反了北京 2015年的承諾。 自上世紀 80年代以來，北京已經簽署了多項保護智慧財產權 的國際協議。 儘管如此，世界上 63%以上的假貨來自於中國，給世界各地的合法企業造 成了數千億美元的損失。
While
Beijing acknowledges that China is now a “mature economy,” the PRC continues to
argue in its dealings with international bodies, including the WTO, that it is
still a “developing country.” Despite
being the top importer of high technology products and ranking second only to
the United States in terms of gross domestic product, defense spending, and
outward investment, China selfdesignates as a developing country to justify
policies and practices that systematically distort multiple sectors globally,
harming the United States and other countries.
即便北京承認中國現在是一個 "成熟的經濟體"，但在與包括世貿組織在內的國際機構打 交道時，中華人民共和國仍舊稱其是一個 "發展中國家"。 儘管中國是高技術產品的第一 大進口國，在國內生產總值、國防開支、對外投資等方面僅次於美國，但中國自稱為發展 中國家的政策和做法在全球範圍內系統性地扭曲了多個領域，損害了美國和其他國家的利 益。
One
Belt One Road (OBOR) is Beijing’s umbrella term to describe a variety of
initiatives, many of which appear designed to reshape international norms,
standards, and networks to advance Beijing’s global interests and vision, while
also serving China’s domestic economic requirements. Through OBOR and other initiatives, the PRC
is expanding the use of Chinese industrial standards in key technology sectors,
part of an effort to strengthen its own companies’ position in the global
marketplace at the expense of non-Chinese firms. Projects that Beijing has labeled OBOR
include: transportation, information and
communications technology and energy infrastructure; industrial parks; media
collaboration; science and technology exchanges; programs on culture and
religion; and even military and security cooperation. Beijing is also seeking to arbitrate
OBOR-related commercial disputes through its own specialized courts, which
answer to the CCP. The United States
welcomes contributions by China to sustainable, high-quality development that
accords with international best practices, but OBOR projects frequently operate
well outside of these standards and are characterized by poor quality,
corruption, environmental degradation, a lack of public oversight or community
involvement, opaque loans, and contracts generating or exacerbating governance
and fiscal problems in host nations.
"一帶一路"（OBOR）是北京用來描述其各種措施的總稱，其中許多措施似乎是為了重塑 國際規範、標準和網路，以促進中國政府的全球利益和願景，同時也為中國國內經濟需求 而服務。 通過一帶一路和其他舉措，中華人民共和國正在擴大中國工業標準在關鍵技術 領域的使用範圍，這也是以犧牲非中國企業的利益為代價，加強中國企業在全球市場上的 地位。 北京標榜的一帶一路項目包括：交通、資訊通信技術和能源基礎設施；工業園 區；媒體合作；科技交流；文化和宗教項目；甚至軍事和安全合作。 北京也在尋求通過 自己的特定的法院以仲裁與一帶一路相關的商業糾紛，而這些法院由中共所領導。 美國 歡迎中國在符合國際最佳實踐的情況下，對可持續、高品質發展的做出貢獻，但一帶一路 項目的運作往往遠遠超出了這些標準，其特點是品質差、腐敗、環境惡化、缺乏公共監督 或社區參與、貸款不透明、合同產生或加劇了東道國的治理和財政問題。
Given
Beijing’s increasing use of
economic leverage to extract political concessions from or exact retribution against
other countries, the United States judges that Beijing will attempt to convert
OBOR projects into undue political influence and military access. Beijing uses a combination of threat and
inducement to pressure governments, elites, corporations, think tanks, and
others – often in an opaque manner – to toe the CCP line and censor free
expression. Beijing has restricted trade
and tourism with Australia, Canada, South Korea, Japan, Norway, the
Philippines, and others, and has detained Canadian citizens, in an effort to
interfere in these countries’ internal political and judicial processes. After the Dalai Lama visited Mongolia in
2016, the PRC government imposed new tariffs on land-locked Mongolia’s mineral
exports passing through China, temporarily paralyzing Mongolia’s economy.
鑒於北京越來越多地利用經濟杠杆從其他國家獲取政治讓步或對其他國家實施報復，美國 判斷，北京將試圖將一帶一路項目轉化為不正當的政治影響和軍事准入。 北京利用威脅 和利誘相結合的方式，向政府、精英、企業、智庫等施壓——往往是以不透明的方式—— 迫使他們站在中共的立場上，審查自由言論。 北京限制了與澳大利亞、加拿大、韓國、 日本、挪威、菲律賓等國的貿易和旅遊，並拘留了加拿大公民，試圖干涉這些國家的內部政治和司法程式。 2016年達賴喇嘛訪問蒙古國後，中華人民共和國政府對途經中國的內 陸的蒙古國礦產出口徵收新的關稅，使蒙古國經濟暫時癱瘓。
Beijing
seeks global recognition for its environmental efforts and claims to promote
“green development.” China, however, has
been the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter by a wide margin for more than
a decade. Beijing has put forward vague
and unenforceable emissions reduction commitments that allow China’s emissions
to keep growing until “around 2030.”
China’s planned growing emissions will outweigh the reductions from the
rest of the world combined. Chinese
firms also export polluting coal-fired power plants to developing countries by
the hundreds. The PRC is also the
world’s largest source of marine plastic pollution, discharging over 3.5
million metric tons into the ocean each year.
The PRC ranks first in the world for illegal, unreported, and
unregulated fishing in coastal nations’ waters around the world, threatening
local economies and harming the marine environment. Chinese leaders’ unwillingness to rein in
these globally harmful practices does not match their rhetorical promises of
environmental stewardship.
北京尋求全球認可，聲稱要推動 "綠色發展" 然而，中國十多年來一直是世界上最大的溫 室氣體排放國。北京提出了模糊的、無法執行的減排承諾，讓中國的排放量持續增長，直 到 "2030 年左右"。中國計畫中的排放量的增長將超過世界其他國家的減排量。中國企業 向發展中國家出口的污染性燃煤電廠也數以百計。中華人民共和國也是世界上最大的海洋 塑膠污染源，每年向海洋排放超過 350 萬噸。中華人民共和國在全球沿海國家的海域非法、 未報告和無管制的捕撈活動居世界首位，威脅了當地的經濟，損害了海洋環境。中國領導 人不願遏制這些對全球有害的做法，與他們對環境管理的口頭承諾並不相符。
2. Challenges to Our Values
2. 我們的價值觀所面臨的挑戰
The
CCP promotes globally a value proposition that challenges the bedrock American
belief in the unalienable right of every person to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. Under the current
generation of leadership, the CCP has accelerated its efforts to portray its
governance system as functioning better than those of what it refers to as
“developed, western countries.” Beijing
is clear that it sees itself as engaged in an ideological competition with the
West. In 2013, General Secretary Xi
called on the CCP to prepare for a “long-term
period of cooperation and conflict”
between two competing systems and declared that “capitalism is bound to die out and socialism is bound
to win.”
中共在全球範圍內宣導一種價值主張，挑戰了美國人對每個人享有生命、自由和追求幸福 的不可剝奪的權利這一基本信念。 在這一代領導層的領導下，中共加快了將其治理體系 描繪成比它所說的 "西方發達國家 "的治理體系運作得更好的努力。 北京很清楚，它認為 自己正在與西方國家進行意識形態的競爭。 2013 年，習總書記呼籲中共準備在兩種相互 競爭的制度之間 "長期合作與衝突"，並宣稱 "資本主義必亡，社會主義必勝"。
The
CCP aims to make China a “global leader in terms of comprehensive national
power and international influence,” as General Secretary Xi expressed in 2017,
by strengthening what it refers to as “the system of socialism with Chinese
characteristics.” This system is rooted
in Beijing’s interpretation of Marxist-Leninist ideology and combines a
nationalistic, single-party dictatorship; a state-directed economy; deployment
of science and technology in the service of the state; and the subordination of
individual rights to serve CCP ends.
This runs counter to principles shared by the United States and many
likeminded countries of representative government, free enterprise, and the
inherent dignity and worth of every individual.
習總書記在 2017 年曾表示，中共的目標是通過加強所謂的 "中國特色社會主義制度"，使 中國成為 "綜合國力和國際影響力的全球領導者"。 這一制度植根於北京對馬克思列寧主 義意識形態的解釋，並將民族主義的一黨專政、國家主導的經濟、為國家服務的科學和技 術部署以及個人權利服從於中共的目的結合在一起。 這違背了美國和許多志同道合的國 家共同的代議制政府、自由企業和每個人的固有尊嚴和價值等原則。
Internationally,
the CCP promotes General Secretary Xi’s
vision for global governance under the banner of “building a community of
common destiny for mankind.” Beijing’s
efforts to compel ideological conformity at home, however, present an
unsettling picture of what a CCP-led “community” looks like in practice: (1) an anticorruption campaign that has
purged political opposition; (2) unjust prosecutions of bloggers, activists,
and lawyers; (3) algorithmically determined arrests of ethnic and religious
minorities; (4) stringent controls over and censorship of information, media,
universities, businesses, and non-governmental
organizations; (5) surveillance and social credit scoring of citizens,
corporations, and organizations; and (6) and arbitrary detention, torture, and
abuse of people perceived to be dissidents.
In a stark example of domestic conformity, local officials publicized a
book burning event at a community library to demonstrate their ideological
alignment to “Xi Jinping Thought.”
在國際上，中共在 "構建人類命運共同體 "的旗幟下，宣傳習總書記的全球治理觀。 然而， 北京在國內強迫意識形態的一致性的努力，卻呈現出了中共領導的 "共同體 "在實踐中的 令人不安的景象。 (1)反腐運動肅清了政治反對派；(2)對博主、活動家和律師進行不公正 的起訴；(3)對少數民族和宗教少數群體進行演算法決定的逮捕；(4)對資訊、媒體、大學、 企業和非政府組織進行嚴格的控制和審查；(5)對公民、企業和組織進行監視和社會信用 評分；(6)任意拘留、酷刑和虐待被認為是異見者的人。 在國內的一個赤裸裸的例子中， 地方官員將發生在社區圖書館的焚書事件公之於眾，以表明他們在意識形態上與 "習近平 思想 "保持一致。
One
disastrous outgrowth of such an approach to governance is Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang, where since 2017,
authorities have detained more than a million Uighurs and members of other
ethnic and religious minority groups in indoctrination camps, where many endure
forced labor, ideological indoctrination, and physical and psychological
abuse. Outside these camps, the regime
has instituted a police state employing emerging technologies such as artificial
intelligence and biogenetics to monitor ethnic minorities’ activities to ensure
allegiance to the CCP. Widespread
religious persecution – of Christians, Tibetan Buddhists, Muslims, and members
of Falun Gong –includes the demolition and desecration of places of worship,
arrests of peaceful believers, forced renunciations of faith, and prohibitions
on raising children in traditions of faith.
這種治理方式所造成的災難性後果之一就是北京在新疆的政策，自 2017 年以來，當局將 一百多萬維吾爾族和其他少數民族及宗教團體成員關押在再教育營中，許多人在那裡忍受 著強迫勞動、意識形態灌輸和身心虐待。 在這些集中營外，政權建立了一個員警國家， 利用人工智慧和生物遺傳學等新興技術來監控少數民族的活動，以確保他們效忠於中共。 對基督教徒、藏傳佛教徒、穆斯林和法輪功成員的廣泛宗教迫害，包括拆毀和褻瀆禮拜場 所、逮捕和平信徒、強迫放棄信仰、禁止按信仰傳統養育子女等。
The CCP’s campaign to compel ideological conformity does not
stop at China’s borders. In recent
years, Beijing has intervened in sovereign nations’ internal affairs to
engineer consent for its policies. PRC
authorities have attempted to extend CCP influence over discourse and behavior
around the world, with recent examples including companies and sports teams in
the United States and the United Kingdom and politicians in Australia and
Europe. PRC actors are exporting the
tools of the CCP’s techno-authoritarian model to countries around the world,
enabling authoritarian states to exert control over their citizens and surveil
opposition, training foreign partners in propaganda and censorship techniques,
and using bulk data collection to shape public sentiment.
中共的強制意識形態認同運動並沒有止步於中國的邊界。 近年來，北京一直在干涉主權 國家的內政，並為其政策謀求認同。中華人民共和國權力機構試圖擴大中共對世界各國的 話語和行為的影響，最近的例子包括美國和英國的公司和運動隊以及澳大利亞和歐洲的政 客。 中華人民共和國的行為人們正在向世界各國輸出中共技術專制模式的工具，使專制 國家能夠控制其公民和監視反對派，對其外國夥伴進行宣傳和審查技術的培訓，並利用大 量的資料收集來塑造公眾情緒。
China’s
party-state controls the world’s most heavily resourced set of propaganda
tools. Beijing communicates its
narrative through state-run television, print, radio, and online organizations
whose presence is proliferating in the United States and around the world. The CCP often conceals its investments in
foreign media entities. In 2015, China
Radio International was revealed to control 33 radio stations in 14 countries
via shell entities, and to subsidize multiple intermediaries through providing
free, pro-Beijing content.
中國的政黨國家控制著世界上資源最豐富的宣傳工具。 北京通過國營的電視、印刷品、廣播和網路組織來傳播其言論，而這些組織在美國和世界 各地的影響力正在不斷擴大。 中共經常隱瞞其對外國媒體公司的投資。 2015 年，中國國 際廣播電臺被曝出通過空殼公司控制了 14 個國家的 33 家電臺，並通過提供免費的、親北 京的內容來補貼多家仲介機構。
Beyond
the media, the CCP uses a range of actors to advance its interests in the United
States and other open democracies. CCP
United Front organizations and agents target businesses, universities, think tanks, scholars,
journalists, and local, state, and Federal officials in the United States and
around the world, attempting to influence discourse and restrict external
influence inside the PRC.
在媒體之外，中共利用一系列人員在美國和其他開放的民主國家推進其利益。 中共統戰 組織和代理人以美國和世界各地的企業、大學、智庫、學者、記者、地方、州和聯邦官員 為目標，試圖影響美國和世界各地的言論，限制中共內部的外來影響。
Beijing
regularly attempts to compel or persuade Chinese nationals and others to
undertake a range of malign behaviors that threaten United States national and
economic security, and undermine academic freedom and the integrity of the
United States research and development enterprise. These behaviors include misappropriation of
technology and intellectual property, failure to appropriately disclose
relationships with foreign government sponsored entities, breaches of contract
and confidentiality, and manipulation of processes for fair and merit-based
allocation of Federal research and development funding. Beijing also attempts to compel Chinese
nationals to report on and threaten fellow Chinese students, protest against
events that run counter to Beijing’s political narrative, and otherwise
restrict the academic freedom that is the hallmark and strength of the American
education system.
北京經常試圖強迫或說服中國人和其他人做出一系列威脅美國國家和經濟安全、破壞美國 研究和發展機構學術自由與真實的惡性行為。 這些行為包括盜用技術和智慧財產權，不 適當披露與外國政府資助的實體的關係，違反合同和保密規定，操縱聯邦研發經費的公平 和擇優分配程式。 北京還試圖強迫中國人報告和威脅其中國同學，抗議與北京的政治敘 事背道而馳的事件，並以其他方式限制作為美國教育體系標誌和優勢的學術自由。
PRC
media entities, journalists, academics, and diplomats are free to operate in
the United States, but Beijing denies reciprocal access to American counterpart
institutions and officials. The PRC
government routinely denies United States officials, including the United States
Ambassador to the PRC, access to Department of State-funded American Cultural
Centers, which are hosted in Chinese universities to share American culture
with the Chinese people. Foreign
reporters working in the PRC often face harassment and intimidation.
中華人民共和國的媒體、記者、學者和外交官可以在美國自由活動，但北京拒絕與美國的 對口機構和官員進行對等的接觸。 中華人民共和國政府經常拒絕美國官員，包括美國駐 中華人民共和國大使在內的美國官員進入美國國務院資助的美國文化中心，這些中心設在 中國的大學裡，旨在與中國人民分享美國文化。 在中華人民共和國工作的外國記者經常 面臨騷擾和恐嚇。
3. Security Challenges
3. 安全方面的挑戰
As China has grown in strength, so has the
willingness and capacity of the CCP to employ intimidation and coercion in its
attempts to eliminate perceived threats to its interests and advance its
strategic objectives globally. Beijing’s
actions belie Chinese leaders’ proclamations that they oppose the threat or use
of force, do not intervene in other countries’ internal affairs, or are
committed to resolving disputes through peaceful dialogue. Beijing contradicts its rhetoric and flouts
its commitments to its neighbors by engaging in provocative and coercive
military and paramilitary activities in the Yellow Sea, the East and South
China Seas, the Taiwan Strait, and Sino-Indian border areas. 隨著中國實力的增強，中共在試圖消除其利益受到的威脅和在全球範圍內推進其戰略目標 時，使用恐嚇和脅迫的意願和能力也在增強。 北京的行動違背了中國領導人所宣稱他們 反對威脅或使用武力，不干涉他國內政，或致力於通過和平對話解決爭端的言論。 北京 違背其言辭，藐視對鄰國的承諾，在黃海、東海和南海、臺灣海峽、中印邊境地區進行挑 釁性、脅迫性的軍事和准軍事活動。
In May 2019, the Department of Defense issued
its annual report to the Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving
the PRC, assessing current and future trajectories of China’s
military-technological development, security and military strategies, and
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) organizational and operational concepts. In July 2019, the PRC Minister of Defense
publicly acknowledged that OBOR is linked to the PRC’s aspirational expansion
of PLA presence overseas, including locations such as the Pacific Islands and
the Caribbean.
2019年 5月，美國國防部向國會發佈了《涉及中華人民共和國的軍事和安全動態》年度報 告，評估了中國當前及未來的軍事技術、安全和軍事戰略的發展軌跡以及中國人民解放軍 的組織和作戰理念。 2019 年 7 月，中華人民共和國國防部長公開承認，一帶一路與中華 人民共和國渴望中國人民解放軍在海外的擴張有關，包括太平洋島嶼和加勒比海等地區。
Beijing’s military buildup threatens United States and allied
national security interests and poses complex challenges for global commerce
and supply chains. Beijing’s
Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy gives the PLA unfettered access into civil
entities developing and acquiring advanced technologies, including state-owned
and private firms, universities, and research programs. Through non-transparent MCF linkages, United
States and other foreign companies are unwittingly feeding dual-use
technologies into PRC military research and development programs, strengthening
the CCP’s coercive ability to suppress domestic opposition and threaten foreign
countries, including United States allies and partners.
北京的軍事建設威脅到美國和盟國的國家安全利益，對全球商業和供應鏈構成了複雜的挑 戰。 北京的軍民融合戰略使解放軍不受限制地進入開發和獲取先進技術的民間實體，包 括國有和私營企業、大學和研究專案。 通過不透明的軍民融合戰略的聯繫，美國和其他 外國公司在不知不覺中向中華人民共和國的軍事研發項目提供兩用技術，加強了中共壓制 國內反對派和威脅外國，包括美國的盟友和夥伴的能力。 The PRC’s attempts to dominate the global information and
communications technology industry through unfair practices is reflected in
discriminatory regulations like the PRC National Cyber Security Law, which
requires companies to comply with Chinese data localization measures that
enable CCP access to foreign data. Other
PRC laws compel companies like Huawei and ZTE to cooperate with Chinese
security services, even when they do business abroad, creating security
vulnerabilities for foreign countries and enterprises utilizing Chinese
vendors’ equipment and services.
中華人民共和國試圖通過不公平的做法主導全球資訊和通信技術產業，這體現在了《中華 人民共和國國家網路安全法》等歧視性法規中，該法要求公司必須遵守中國的資料當地語 系化措施，使中共能夠獲取外國資料。 中華人民共和國的其他法律迫使華為和中興這樣 的公司必須與中國的安全服務機構合作，即使它們在國外開展業務，也會給外國和使用中 國供應商設備和服務的企業製造安全性漏洞。
Beijing
refuses to honor its commitment to provide travel documents for Chinese
citizens with orders of removal from the United States in a timely and
consistent manner, effectively blocking their removals from our country and
creating security risks for American communities. In addition, the PRC’s violations of our
bilateral consular treaty puts United States citizens at risk in China, with
many Americans detrimentally affected by the PRC government’s coercive exit bans
and wrongful detentions.
北京拒絕履行承諾，及時、一致地提供持有美國驅逐令的中國公民的旅行證件，有效地阻 止了他們被遣送出境，給美國社會造成了安全隱患。 此外，中華人民共和國違反我國的 雙邊領事條約，使美國公民在中國面臨風險，許多美國人因中華人民共和國政府的強制出 境禁令和非法拘留而受到損害。
Approach
方針
The
NSS demands that the United States “rethink the policies of the past two
decades – policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and
their inclusion in international institutions and global commerce would turn
them into benign actors and trustworthy partners. For the most part, this premise turned out to
be false. Rival actors use propaganda
and other means to try to discredit democracy.
They advance anti-Western views and spread false information to create
divisions among ourselves, our allies, and our partners.”
國家安全局要求美國“重新思考過去 20年的政策——基於這樣一種假設，即與競爭對手 接觸並將其納入國際機構和全球貿易將使它們成為善意的行為者和值得信賴的夥伴。 在 大多數情況下，這個前提被證明是錯誤的。 敵對的角色利用宣傳和其他手段試圖詆毀民 主。 他們鼓吹反西方觀點，散佈虛假資訊，在我們自己、我們的盟友和我們的夥伴之間 製造分歧。”
Guided
by a return to principled realism, the United States is responding to the CCP’s
direct challenge by acknowledging that we are in a strategic competition and
protecting our interests appropriately.
The principles of the United States’ approach to China are articulated
both in the NSS and our vision for the Indo-Pacific region – sovereignty,
freedom, openness, rule of law, fairness, and reciprocity. United States-China relations do not
determine our Indo-Pacific strategy, but rather fall within that strategy and
the overarching NSS. By the same token,
our vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific region does not exclude China.
在回歸原則性現實主義的指導下，美國正在通過承認我們處於戰略競爭和適當地保護我們 的利益來回應中共的直接挑戰。 美國對華方針的原則在《國家安全戰略》和我們對印太 地區的願景中都有闡述，即主權、自由、開放、法治、公平和互惠。美中關係並不決定我 們的印度洋太平洋戰略，而是屬於這一戰略和國家安全戰略的總體框架。 同樣，我們建 立自由開放的印度洋太平洋地區的願景並不排斥中國。
The
United States holds the PRC government to the same standards and principles
that apply to all nations. We believe
this is the treatment that the people of China want and deserve from their own
government and from the international community. Given the strategic choices China’s
leadership is making, the United States now acknowledges and accepts the
relationship with the PRC as the CCP has always framed it internally: one of great power competition.
美國認為，中華人民共和國政府應遵守適用於所有國家的同樣標準和原則。 我們相信， 這是中國人民希望並理應從中國政府和國際社會得到的待遇。 鑒於中國領導層正在做出 的戰略選擇，美國現在承認並接受中共內部一直以來對中美關係的描述：大國競爭的關 係。
United
States policies are not premised on an attempt to change the PRC’s domestic
governance model, nor do they make concessions to the CCP’s narratives of
exceptionalism and victimhood. Rather,
United States policies are designed to protect our interests and empower our
institutions to withstand the CCP’s malign behavior and collateral damage from
the PRC’s internal governance problems.
Whether the PRC eventually converges with the principles of the free and
open order can only be determined by the Chinese people themselves. We recognize that Beijing, not Washington,
has agency over and responsibility for the PRC government’s actions.
美國的政策並非以試圖改變中華人民共和國國內治理模式為前提，但也不會對中共關於例 外主義和受害者的敘述作出讓步。 相反，美國的政策是為了保護我們的利益，使我們的 機構能夠抵禦中共的惡性行為和中國人民共和國內部治理問題帶來的附帶損害。 中華人 民共和國是否最終會與自由開放的秩序原則接軌，只能由中國人民自己決定。 我們承 認，北京，而不是華盛頓，對中華人民共和國政府的行為負有責任。
The
United States rejects CCP attempts at false equivalency between rule-of-law and
rule-by-law; between counterterrorism and oppression; between representative
governance and autocracy; and between market-based competition and
state-directed mercantilism. The United
States will continue to challenge Beijing’s propaganda and false narratives
that distort the truth and attempt to demean American values and ideals.
美國反對中共企圖在法治與法制、反恐與壓迫、代議制與專制、市場競爭與國家主導的 重商主義之間進行虛假等同。 美國將繼續挑戰北京的宣傳和歪曲事實真相、企圖貶低美 國價值觀和理想的虛假言論。
Similarly,
the United States does not and will not accommodate Beijing’s actions that
weaken a free, open, and rules-based international order. We will continue to refute the CCP’s
narrative that the United States is in strategic retreat or will shirk our
international security commitments. The
United States will work with our robust network of allies and likeminded partners
to resist attacks on our shared norms and values, within our own governance
institutions, around the world, and in international organizations.
同樣，美國不會也不會遷就北京削弱自由、開放和基於規則的國際秩序的行動。 我們將 繼續駁斥中共關於美國在戰略上倒退或逃避我們的國際安全承諾的說法。 美國將與我們 強大的盟友和志同道合的夥伴網路合作，在我們自己的治理機構內、在世界各地以及在國 際組織中抵制對我們共同規範和價值觀的攻擊。
The
American people’s generous contributions to China’s development are a matter of
historical record – just as the Chinese people’s remarkable accomplishments in
the era of Reform and Opening are undeniable.
However, the negative trend lines of Beijing’s policies and practices
threaten the legacy of the Chinese people and their future position in the
world.
美國人民為中國的發展做出的慷慨貢獻是有史可查的--正如中國人民在改革開放時代取得 的輝煌成就是不可否認的一樣。 但是，北京的政策和做法的負面趨勢線，威脅到了中國 人民的遺產和其未來在世界上的地位。
Beijing
has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not offer compromises in response to
American displays of goodwill, and that its actions are not constrained by its
prior commitments to respect our interests.
As such, the United States responds to the PRC’s actions rather than its
stated commitments. Moreover, we do not
cater to Beijing’s demands to create a proper “atmosphere” or “conditions” for
dialogue.
北京一再表明，它不會對美國的善意表示妥協，其行動不受其先前承諾尊重我國利益的限 制。 因此，美國將回應的是中華人民共和國的行動，而不是其聲明的承諾。此外，我們 不再滿足北京的要求，為對話創造適當的 "氣氛 "或 "條件"。
Likewise,
the United States sees no value in engaging with Beijing for symbolism and
pageantry; we instead demand tangible results and constructive outcomes. We acknowledge and respond in kind to
Beijing’s transactional approach with timely incentives and costs, or credible
threats thereof. When quiet diplomacy
proves futile, the United States will increase public pressure on the PRC
government and take action to protect United States interests by leveraging
proportional costs when necessary.
同樣，美國認為與北京的接觸沒有任何價值，只是為了象徵性的、花哨的東西；我們要 求的是切實的結果和建設性的結果。 我們承認並以同樣的方式回應北京的交易性做法， 對其及時提供激勵和成本，或做出可信的威脅。 當平靜的外交手段被證明是徒勞無益的 時候，美國將加大對中華人民共和國政府的公眾壓力，並在必要的時候採取相應行動，利 用成比例的成本來保護美國的利益。
The
PRC government has fallen short of its commitments in many areas including: trade and investment; freedoms of expression
and belief; political interference; freedoms of navigation and overflight;
cyber and other types of espionage and theft; weapons proliferation;
environmental protection; and global health.
Agreements with Beijing must include stringent verification and
enforcement mechanisms.
中華人民共和國政府在許多領域沒有履行其承諾，包括：貿易和投資；言論和信仰自由； 政治干預；航行和領空自由；網路和其他類型的間諜活動和盜竊；武器擴散；環境保護； 以及全球健康。與北京的協議必須包括嚴格的核查和執行機制。
We
speak candidly with the Chinese people and expect honesty from PRC
leaders. In matters of diplomacy, the
United States responds appropriately to the CCP’s insincere or vague threats,
and stands up alongside our allies and partners to resist coercion. Through our continuous and frank engagement,
the United States welcomes cooperation by China to expand and work toward
shared objectives in ways that benefit the peace, stability, and prosperity of
the world. Our approach does not exclude
the PRC. The United States stands ready
to welcome China’s positive contributions.
我們與中國人民坦誠相待，並期待中華人民共和國領導人坦誠相待。 在外交問題上，美 國對中共的不真誠或模糊的威脅作出適當的回應，並與我們的盟友和夥伴站在一起抵制 脅迫。 通過持續和坦誠的接觸，美國歡迎中國以有利於世界和平、穩定和繁榮的方式擴 大與美方的合作，努力實現共同目標。 我們的做法並不排斥中華人民共和國。 美國隨時 準備歡迎中國的積極貢獻。
As
the above tenets of our approach imply, competition necessarily includes engagement
with the PRC, but our engagements are selective and results-oriented, with each
advancing our national interests. We
engage with the PRC to negotiate and enforce commitments to ensure fairness and
reciprocity; clarify Beijing’s intentions to avoid misunderstanding; and
resolve disputes to prevent escalation.
The United States is committed to maintaining open channels of
communication with the PRC to reduce risks and manage crises. We expect the PRC to also keep these channels
open and responsive.
正如上述原則所示，競爭必然包括與中華人民共和國的接觸，但我們的接觸是有選擇性的、 以結果為導向的，每一次接觸都是為了促進我們的國家利益。 我們與中華人民共和國的 接觸是為了談判和履行承諾，以確保公平和互惠；明晰北京的意圖，避免誤解；解決爭端，防止爭端升級。 美國致力於與中華人民共和國保持開放的溝通管道，以減少風險和管理 危機。 我們期望中方也能保持這些管道的暢通和回應。
Implementation
實現
In
accordance with the President’s NSS, the political, economic, and security
policies outlined in this report seek to protect the American people and
homeland, promote American prosperity, preserve peace through strength, and
advance a free and open vision abroad.
During the first 3 years of the Administration, the United States has
taken significant steps in implementing this strategy as it applies to
China. 根據川普總統發佈的《國家安全政策》，本報告中概述的有關政治，經濟和安全的政策旨 在保護美國人民及其家園，促進美國繁榮，通過力量維護和平，並在國外推進自由開放的 願景。 在政府成立的頭三年中，美國為實施適用於中國的這一戰略採取了重要措施。
1. Protect the American People, the Homeland,
and the American Way of Life
1. 保護美國人民及其家園和生活方式的安全
The
United States Department of Justice (DOJ)’s China Initiative and Federal Bureau of Investigation
are directing resources to identify and prosecute trade secrets theft, hacking,
and economic espionage; and increasing efforts to protect against malign
foreign investment in United States infrastructure, supply chain threats, and
foreign agents seeking to influence American policy. For example, DOJ informed PRC state media
company CGTN-America of its obligation to register as a foreign agent as
specified under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), which obligates
registrants to disclose their activities to Federal authorities and
appropriately label information materials they distribute. CGTN-America subsequently registered under
FARA.
美國司法部（DOJ）的中國行動計畫組和聯邦調查局正在調配資源來識別和起訴包括商業 機密盜竊，駭客入侵和經濟間諜活動； 並加大力度防止外國對美國基礎設施的惡意投資， 供應鏈威脅以及外國代理人尋求對美國政策的影響。例如，司法部通知中華人民共和國 國家媒體 CGTN-America 根據《外國代理人登記法》的規定，其有義務登記為外國代理人。 該法規定，登記人有義務向聯邦政府部門披露其活動，並適當地對他們所發佈的內容進 行標注。隨後，CGTN-America根據《外國代理人登記法》的規定完成了登記。 The Administration is also responding to CCP
propaganda in the United States by highlighting malign behavior, countering
false narratives, and compelling transparency.
United States officials, including those from the White House and the
Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, are leading efforts to educate the
American public about the PRC government’s exploitation of our free and open
society to push a CCP agenda inimical to United States interests and
values. In an effort to achieve
reciprocity of access, the Department of State has implemented a policy
requiring
Chinese
diplomats to notify the United States Government before meeting with state and
local government officials and academic institutions.
美國政府還針對中共部署在美國的大外宣做出了回應，包括公佈其惡意行為，對其發佈的 虛假資訊進行回擊，並要求其保證資訊透明。包括來自白宮、國務院、國防部和司法部 的美國政府官員正在牽頭對美國公眾進行教育，包括關於中華人民共和國政府是如何通 過破壞美國自由和開放的社會來推行與美國利益和價值觀相違背的中共議程。國務院已 經實施了一項政策，要求中國外交官在會見州和地方政府官員以及學術機構之前，必須 通知美國政府。
The Administration is raising awareness of and
actively combatting Beijing’s co-optation and coercion of its own citizens and
others in United States academic institutions, beyond traditional espionage and
influence efforts. We are working with
universities to protect the rights of Chinese students on American campuses,
provide information to counter CCP propaganda and disinformation, and ensure an
understanding of ethical codes of conduct in an American academic
environment.
美國政府正在提高認知，積極打擊北京除傳統間諜和社會影響手段之外，夥同或者脅迫中 國公民和其他在美學術機構工作人員的行為。我們正在與大學合作，以保護中國學生在 美國校園的權利，提供資訊共同對抗中共大外宣和虛假資訊，並保障了美國學術環境中 對道德行為準則的共識。
Chinese
students represent the largest cohort of foreign students in the United States
today. The United States values the
contributions of Chinese students and researchers. As of 2019, the number of Chinese students
and researchers in the United States has reached an all-time high, while the
number of student visa denials to Chinese applicants has steadily
declined. The United States strongly
supports the principles of open academic discourse and welcomes international
students and researchers conducting legitimate academic pursuits; we are
improving processes to screen out the small minority of Chinese applicants who
attempt to enter the United States under false pretenses or with malign
intent.
中國學生是當今美國最大的外國學生群體。美國重視中國學生和研究人員的貢獻。 截至 2019 年，美國的中國學生和研究人員的數量已達到歷史最高水準，而中國留學簽證的拒 簽數量正在穩步下降。美國堅決支持學術公開討論的原則，歡迎國際學生和研究人員進 行合法的學術追求；我們正在改進程式，以期篩選出那些極少數的企圖以虛假藉口或不 良意圖進入美國中國申請者。 In the United States research community,
Federal agencies such as the National Institutes of Health and the Department
of Energy have updated or clarified regulations and procedures to ensure
compliance with applicable standards of conduct and reporting, in order to
improve transparency and prevent conflicts of interest. The National Science and Technology Council’s
Joint Committee on the Research Environment is developing standards for
Federally-funded research, and best practices for United States research
institutions. The Department of Defense
is working to ensure grantees do not also have contracts with China’s talent recruitment programs, while also
continuing to welcome foreign researchers.
在美國研究界，為了提高透明度和防止利益衝突，包括美國國立衛生研究院(NIH)和能源 部在內的聯邦機構，已經更新或澄清了條例和程式以確保遵守適用的行為標準和報告標 準。國家環境研究科學與技術聯合委員會正在制定相關標準，關於聯邦政府資助的研究 項目和美國研究機構的最佳實踐。國防部正在研究如何確保受贈人不會與中國的千人、 百人計畫等人才招募計畫有任何聯繫，同時也繼續歡迎外國研究人員加入。
To
prevent foreign malign actors from gaining access to United States information
networks, the President issued the “Executive Order on Securing the Information
and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain” and the “Executive
Order on Establishing the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation
in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector.” The implementation of these Executive Orders
will prevent certain companies associated with or answering to the intelligence
and security apparatus of foreign adversaries from, for example, readily
accessing the private and sensitive information of the United States
Government, the United States private sector, and individual Americans. To ensure protection of our information
worldwide, including sensitive military and intelligence data, the United
States is actively engaging with our allies and partners, including in
multilateral fora, to promote a set of common standards for secure, resilient,
and trusted communications platforms that underpin the global information
economy. To compel Beijing to adhere to
norms of responsible state behavior, the United States is working with allies
and like-minded partners to attribute and otherwise deter malicious cyber
activities.
為了防止外國惡性行為者進入美國的資訊網路，總統發佈了《保護資訊和通信技術和服務 供應鏈安全的行政命令》和《設立評估外國參與美國電信服務業委員會的行政命令》。 這些行政命令的執行，將防止某些與外國敵對勢力的情報和安全機構有聯繫或聽命於它 們的公司獲取敏感資訊，例如，防止它們輕易地接觸到美國政府、美國私營企業和美國 公民的隱私的和敏感的資訊。為了確保我們的資訊在全球範圍內得到保護，包括敏感的 軍事和情報資料，美國正在積極與我們的盟國和合作夥伴進行接觸，包括在多邊論壇上 推廣一套共同的安全、彈性和值得信賴的通信平臺，為全球資訊經濟的發展奠定基礎。 為迫使中共政府遵守負責任的國家行為規範，美國正在與盟國和志同道合的夥伴合作， 以定位和遏制惡意網路活動。
The
Administration is implementing the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization
Act to update and strengthen the capacity of the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to address growing national security
concerns over foreign exploitation of investment structures, which previously
fell outside CFIUS jurisdiction. This
includes preventing Chinese companies from exploiting access to United States
innovation through minority investments in order to modernize the Chinese
military. The United States has updated
its export control regulations, particularly in light of Beijing’s
whole-of-society MCF strategy and its efforts to acquire advanced technologies
related to hypersonics, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, biotechnology,
and other emerging and foundational technologies. We are also engaging allies and partners to
develop their own foreign investment screening mechanisms, and to update and
implement export controls collaboratively through multilateral regimes and
other forums. 政府正在實施《外國投資風險審查現代化法案》，以更新和加強在“美外國投資委員會投 資委員會”（CFIUS）的能力，以解決外國投資者濫用投資結構導致的日益增長的國家安 全擔憂，以前不屬於“美國外國投資委員會”的管轄範圍。這包括防止中國企業通過少量投 資進入美國的科技創新領域，並將其用於增強中國軍隊的實力。美國更新了出口管制條 例，特別是鑒於北京的基於全社會的軍民融合戰略及其努力在獲取高超音速技術、量子 計算、人工智慧、生物技術和其他新興和基礎技術。我們還讓盟友和夥伴開發他們自己 的外國投資審查機制，並對多邊政權和其他論壇更新和實施出口管制。
The United States Government is also taking
concrete actions to protect the American consumer from counterfeit and
substandard products. Between 2017 and
2018, the United States Department of Homeland Security seized more than 59,000
shipments of counterfeit goods, produced in the PRC, valued at more than $2.1
billion. This represents five times the
total shipments and value seized from all other foreign countries combined.
美國政府也在採取切實行動，保護美國消費者免受假冒偽劣產品的侵害。在 2017 年至 2018年期間，美國國土安全部查獲了5.9萬多批在中國生產的假冒偽劣商品，價值超過21 億美元。這相當於從其他所有外國國家查獲的貨物總數和價值的 5倍。
In
addition to falsely branded apparel, footwear, handbags, and watches, United
States Customs and Border Protection
intercepted three shipments containing 53,000 illegal Chinese gun parts and
electronics that could have compromised the security and privacy of American
businesses and consumers. United States
law enforcement agencies are also targeting counterfeit pharmaceuticals and
cosmetics originating from China, which have been found to contain high levels
of contaminants, including bacteria and animal waste that pose a danger to
American consumers.
除了假冒品牌的服裝、鞋類、手袋和手錶外，美國海關和邊境保護局截獲了可能會危及美 國企業和消費者的安全和隱私的，三批載有 53000 個非法的中國的槍支零部件和電子產品。 美國的執法機構也在對原產於中國的假藥和化妝品做篩查，這些藥品和化妝品被發現含 有大量的污染物，包括細菌和動物排泄物，這些都對美國消費者構成威脅。
The
United States is working with Chinese authorities to stem the deadly flow of
illicit Chinese fentanyl from the PRC to the United States. In December 2018, the President secured a
commitment from his Chinese counterpart to control all forms of fentanyl in the
PRC. With the Chinese regulatory regime
in place since May 2019, United States and PRC law enforcement agencies are
sharing intelligence and coordinating to set conditions for enforcement actions
that will deter Chinese drug producers and traffickers. The United States is also working with China’s postal agencies to improve tracking of small
parcels for law enforcement purposes. 美國正在與中國當局合作，以阻止致命的芬太尼被非法的從中華人民共和國運往美國。 2018 年 12 月，習近平主席向川普總統承諾在中國管制一切形式的芬太尼。隨著 2019 年
5 月到位的中國監管制度，美國和中華人民共和國執法部門將通過共用情報，協調配合的執法行動來震懾中國毒品生產者和販毒者。美國還與中國的郵政機構合作，加強對小型 包裹進行以執法為目的的檢測。
2. Promote American Prosperity
2. 促進美國的繁榮
In
response to the PRC’s documented unfair and abusive trade practices and
industrial policies, the Administration is taking strong actions to protect
American businesses, workers, and farmers, and to put an end to Beijing’s
practices that have contributed to a hollowing-out of the United States
manufacturing base. The United States is
committed to rebalancing the United States-China economic relationship. Our whole-of-government approach supports
fair trade and advances United States competitiveness, promotes United States
exports, and breaks down unjust barriers to United States trade and
investment. Having failed since 2003 to
persuade Beijing to adhere to its economic commitments through regular,
high-level dialogues, the United States is confronting China’s
market-distorting forced technology transfer and intellectual property
practices by imposing costs in the form of tariffs levied on Chinese goods
coming into the United States. Those
tariffs will remain in place until a fair Phase Two trade deal is agreed to by
the United States and the PRC.
針對中華人民共和國記錄在案的不公平和虐待性貿易做法和工業政策，美國政府正在採取 強有力的行動，來保護美國的企業、工人和農民，並結束了北京的做法，因為這些做法 導致了美國製造業的空心化。美國致力於重新平衡中美經濟關係。我們的全政府的做法 支持公平貿易，提高美國的競爭力，促進美國的出口，並打破對美國貿易的不公正壁壘 和投資。美國自 2003 年以來一直嘗試通過定期的高級別對話，希望但未能說服北京遵守 其經濟發展戰略。美國對於中國的扭曲市場的強迫技術轉讓和智慧財產權的做法，採取 了對進入美國的中國商品徵收關稅的形式以提高其成本。這些關稅將繼續實施，直到美 國和中華人民共和國達成公平的第二階段貿易協定。
In
response to Beijing’s repeated failure to reduce or eliminate its
market-distorting subsidies and overcapacity, the United States imposed tariffs
to protect our strategically important steel and aluminum industries. For those unfair Chinese trade practices that
are subject to dispute settlement at the WTO, the United States continues to
pursue and win multiple cases. Finally,
to crack down on China’s dumping and subsidies across a broad range of industries,
the Department of Commerce is making greater utility of United States
antidumping and countervailing duties laws than in past administrations.
針對北京一直以來的不減少或取消其扭曲市場的補貼和過剩的產能，美國徵收關稅以保護 我國具有重要戰略意義的鋼鐵行業和鋁業。對於那些需要在 WTO 進行爭端解決的中國不 公平貿易行為，美國繼續進行訴訟並在多個案件中獲勝。最後，為了打擊中國在眾多行 業中的傾銷和補貼，美國商務部正在實施比往屆政府都更大力度的反傾銷稅和反補貼稅 法。
In
January 2020, the United States and the PRC signed Phase One of an economic and
trade agreement that requires structural reforms and other changes to China’s
economic and trade regime, addressing several longstanding United States
concerns. The agreement prohibits the
PRC from forcing or pressuring foreign companies to transfer their technology
as a condition for doing business in China; strengthens protection and
enforcement of intellectual property in China in all key areas; creates new
market opportunities in China for United States agriculture and financial
services by addressing policy barriers; and addresses longstanding, unfair
currency practices. The agreement also
establishes a strong dispute resolution mechanism that ensures prompt and
effective implementation and enforcement.
By addressing structural barriers to trade and making the commitments
fully enforceable, the Phase One agreement will expand United States exports to
China. As part of this agreement, the
PRC committed over the next 2 years to increase imports of United States goods
and services by no less than $200 billion in four broad categories: manufactured goods, agriculture, energy, and
services. This agreement marks critical
progress toward a more balanced trade relationship and a more level playing
field for American workers and companies.
2020年1月，美國和中華人民共和國簽署了第一階段經貿協議，要求對中國的經貿體制進 行結構性改革和其他方面的改革，解決美國長期以來的幾項關切。該協議禁止中華人民 共和國強迫或迫使外國公司轉讓其技術作為在中國開展業務的條件；在所有關鍵領域加 強對中國智慧財產權的保護和執行；通過解決政策壁壘，為美國農業和金融服務在中國 創造新的市場機會；解決長期以來不公平的匯率問題。該協議還建立了強有力的爭端解 決機制，確保迅速有效地實施和執行。通過解決結構性貿易壁壘並使承諾完全可執行， 第一階段協議將擴大美國對中國的出口。作為該協議的一部分，中華人民共和國承諾在 未來兩年內將在四大類商品、製造業商品、農產品、能源和服務業中增加不少於 2000 億 美元的進口。該協議對美國工人和企業意味著一個更平衡的貿易關係和一個更公平的競 爭環境。
Domestically,
the Administration is taking steps to strengthen the United States economy and
promote economic sectors of the future, such as 5G technology, through tax reforms
and a robust deregulatory agenda. The
President’s “Executive Order on Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial
Intelligence” is an example of a United States Government initiative to promote
investment and collaboration to ensure the United States continues to lead in
innovation and setting standards for a growing industry.
美國政府在國內正在採取措施加強經濟，並推行面向未來的經濟，比如通過稅制改革和強 有力的放鬆管制議程，來促進 5G 技術的發展。川普總統的 "關於維持美國在人工智慧領 域領導地位的行政命令"是一個美國政府發起的，以確保美國繼續在高速發展的行業中得 以領導創新和制定標準的例證。
Together
with other likeminded nations, the United States promotes an economic vision
based on principles of sovereignty, free markets, and sustainable
development. Alongside the European
Union and Japan, the United States is engaged in a robust trilateral process to
develop disciplines for state-owned enterprises, industrial subsidies, and
forced technology transfers. We will
also continue to work with our allies and partners to ensure that
discriminatory industrial standards do not become global standards. As the world’s most valuable consumer market,
largest source of foreign direct investment, and leading wellspring of global
technological innovation, the United States engages extensively with allies and
partners to evaluate shared challenges and coordinate effective responses to
ensure continued peace and prosperity.
We work closely with United States companies to build their
competitiveness at home and abroad while fostering sustainable development
through programs such as Prosper Africa, America Crece in Latin America and the
Caribbean, and Enhancing Development and Growth through Energy in the
Indo-Pacific region.
美國與其他志同道合的國家一道，促進以主權、自由市場和可持續發展原則為基礎的經濟 願景。美國正與歐洲聯盟和日本一道，參與一個強有力的三邊進程，為國有企業、工業 補貼和強迫技術轉讓制定原則 。我們還將繼續與我們的盟友和夥伴合作，確保歧視性的 工業標準不會成為全球標準。作為世界上最有價值的消費市場、最大的外國直接投資來 源和全球技術創新的主要源泉，美國與盟國和夥伴廣泛接觸，評估共同的挑戰，協調有 效的應對措施，以確保持續的和平與繁榮。我們與美國公司緊密合作，在促進可持續發 展的同時，建立其在國內外的競爭力，通過諸如 "非洲繁榮"、"拉丁美洲和加勒比地區的 美洲克雷斯” 和通過能源促進印度洋太平洋區域的發展和增長。
3. Preserve Peace through Strength
3. 通過力量維護和平
The
2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) prioritizes long-term competition with
China and emphasizes modernization and partnerships to counter the PLA’s
technological advancements, force development, and growing international
presence and assertiveness. As described
in the Nuclear Posture Review, the Administration is prioritizing the
modernization of the nuclear triad, including the development of supplementary
capabilities designed to deter Beijing from using its weapons of mass
destruction or conducting other strategic attacks. Meanwhile, the United States continues to
urge China’s leaders to come to the table and begin arms control and strategic
risk reduction discussions as a nuclear power with a modern and growing nuclear
arsenal and the world’s largest collection of intermediate range delivery
systems. The United States believes it
is in the interest of all nations to improve Beijing’s transparency, prevent
miscalculations, and avoid costly arms buildups. 2018 年的《國防戰略》提高了中國的長期競爭的優先順序，強調通過現代化和合作夥伴 對抗中國人民解放軍的技術進步、力量發展以及日益增長的國際存在和攻擊性。正如 《核態勢評估報告》中所描述的那樣，美國政府正在將核海陸空核武器的現代化作為優 先事項，包括發展旨在阻止北京使用其大規模殺傷性武器或進行其他戰略攻擊的備用能 力。同時，由於中國正在成為一個擁有現代化的、不斷增長的核武庫和世界上最大的中 程導彈系統的核大國，美國敦促中國領導人走到談判桌前，開始討論軍備控制和減少戰 略風險。美國認為，提高北京的透明度，防止誤判，避免代價高昂的軍備開支，符合所 有國家的利益。
The
Department of Defense is moving quickly to deploy hypersonic platforms,
increasing investments in cyber and space capabilities, and developing more
lethal fires based on resilient, adaptive, and cost-effective platforms. Together, these capabilities are intended to
deter and counter Beijing’s growing ambitions and the PLA’s drive toward technological
parity and superiority.
國防部正在迅速部署高超音速系統，增加對網路安全和太空能力的投資，並在彈性、可適 應和性價比高的平臺基礎上開發更多的致命武器。這些能力加在一起，目的在於遏制和 對抗北京日益增長的野心和解放軍對科技平等和優勢的追求。
As part of our worldwide freedom of navigation
operations program, the United States is pushing back on Beijing’s hegemonic assertions and excessive
claims. The United States military will
continue to exercise the right to navigate and operate wherever international
law allows, including in the South China Sea.
We are speaking up for regional allies and partners, and providing
security assistance to help them build capacity to withstand Beijing’s attempts
to use its military, paramilitary, and law enforcement forces to coerce and
prevail in disputes. In 2018, the United
States military withdrew the invitation for the PLA to participate in the biennial
Rim of the Pacific exercise due to Beijing’s deployment of advanced missile
systems onto manmade features in the South China Sea.
作為我們全球自由導航行動方案的一部分，美國正在回擊北京的霸權主義和過度主張。美 軍將繼續在國際法允許的地方，包括在南中國海，行使航行權和行動權。我們正在為地 區盟友和夥伴發聲，並提供安全援助，幫助他們建立能力，抵禦北京利用其軍事、准軍 事和執法力量脅迫和在爭端中取得勝利的企圖。2018 年，由於北京在南中國海的人工島 上部署了先進的導彈系統，美國軍方取消了對中國人民解放軍參加兩年一度的環太平洋 軍事演習的邀請。
Stronger alliances and partnerships are a cornerstone
of the NDS. The United States is building partner capacity and deepening
interoperability to develop a combat-credible forward operating presence, fully
integrated with allies and partners to deter and deny PRC aggression. The
Administration’s Conventional Arms Transfer policy aims to promote United
States arms sales and accelerate the transformation of partner military
capabilities in a strategic and complementary manner. In June 2019, the
Department of Defense released its first Indo-Pacific Strategy Report,
articulating the Department’s implementation of the NDS and our
whole-of-government strategy for the Indo-Pacific region.
更強的聯盟和夥伴關係是國防戰略的基石。美國正在建設合作夥伴的能力，深化互通性， 以發展一支戰鬥力強的前方作戰力量，並與盟國和夥伴充分融合，以遏制和抵禦中華人民 共和國的侵略。政府的常規武器轉讓政策旨在以戰略互補的方式促進美國的武器銷售和加 快合作夥伴軍事能力的轉型。2019年6月，美國國防部發佈了首份《印太戰略報告》，明 確闡述了國防部實施的國防戰略的實施情況以及我們對整個印太地區的整體政府戰略。
The
United States will continue to maintain strong unofficial relations with Taiwan
in accordance with our “One China” policy, based on the Taiwan Relations Act
and the three United States-PRC Joint Communiques. The United States maintains
that any resolution of cross-Strait differences must be peaceful and according
to the will of the people on both sides, without resorting to threat or
coercion. Beijing’s failure to honor its commitments under the communiques, as
demonstrated by its massive military build-up, compels the United States to
continue to assist the Taiwan military in maintaining a credible self-defense,
which deters aggression and helps to ensure peace and stability in the region.
In a 1982 memorandum, President Ronald Reagan insisted “that the quantity and
quality of the arms provided Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat posed
by the PRC.” In 2019, the United States approved more than $10 billion of arms
sales to Taiwan.
根據《臺灣關係法》和美中兩國的三個《中美聯合公報》，美國將在現有的“一個中國” 政策下，繼續與臺灣保持強有力的非官方關係。美國主張，任何兩岸分歧的解決都必須是 和平的,符合兩岸人民的意願,而不是訴諸威脅或脅迫。北京不履行其在公約中的承諾，體 現在其大規模的軍事建設中，這迫使美國繼續協助臺灣軍方維持一個可靠的自衛（可信的 自衛），以遏制侵略，並有助於確保該地區的和平與穩定。在1982年的一份備忘錄中，羅 奈爾得-雷根總統堅稱，"提供給臺灣的武器數量和品質應完全取決於中華人民共和國所構 成的威脅"。2019年，美國批准了超過100億美元對台軍售。
The
United States remains committed to maintaining a constructive, results-oriented
relationship with the PRC. The United States conducts defense contacts and
exchanges with the PRC to communicate strategic intent; prevent and manage crises;
reduce the risks of miscalculation and misunderstanding that could escalate
into conflict; and cooperate in areas of shared interest. The United States
military engages with the PLA to develop effective crisis communication
mechanisms, including responsive channels for de-escalation in unplanned
scenarios.
美國仍然致力於與中華人民共和國保持建設性的、注重成果的關係。美國與中華人民共和 國進行國防接觸和交流，以傳達戰略意圖；預防和管理危機；減少可能升級為衝突的誤 判和誤解的風險；並在共同關心的領域進行合作。美國軍方與中國人民解放軍合作，建 立有效的危機溝通機制，其中包括在意外情況下減少衝突的反應管道。
4. Advance American Influence
4. 提升美國的影響力
For
the past seven decades, the free and open international order has provided the
stability to allow sovereign, independent states to flourish and contribute to
unprecedented global economic growth. As a large, developed country and a major
beneficiary of this order, the PRC should help guarantee freedom and openness
for other nations around the globe. When Beijing instead promotes or abets
authoritarianism, self-censorship, corruption, mercantilist economics, and
intolerance of ethnic and religious diversity, the United States leads
international efforts to resist and counter these malign activities. 在過去70年中，自由開放的國際秩序為主權獨立國家的繁榮發展提供了保證，為全球經濟 的空前增長做出了貢獻。作為一個發達的大國和這一秩序的主要受益者，中華人民共和國 應該幫助保障全球其他國家的自由和開放。當北京反而提倡或教唆專制主義、自我審查、腐敗、重商主義經濟、不容忍民族和宗教多樣性時，美國就應該引導國際社會努力抵制和 打擊這些惡性活動。
In
2018 and 2019, the Secretary of State hosted the first two gatherings of the
Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom. Along with the President’s
unprecedented Global Call to Protect Religious Freedom during the United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2019, these events brought together
global leaders to address religious persecution around the world. During both
ministerials, the United States and partner countries released joint statements
calling on the PRC government to respect the rights of Uighur and other Turkic
Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, Christians, and Falun Gong adherents, all of whom
face repression and persecution in China. In February 2020, the Department of
State launched the first ever International Religious Freedom Alliance with 25
likeminded partners to defend the right of every person to worship without
fear. The President met with Chinese dissidents and survivors on the margins of
the 2019 Ministerial, and he shared the stage during UNGA with victims of
religious persecution from China. The United States also continues to support
human rights defenders and independent civil society working in or on China.
在 2018 年和 2019 年，美國國務卿主辦了前兩次促進宗教自由的部長級會議。這些活動與 總統在 2019 年 9 月聯合國大會期間發出的前所未有的全球保護宗教自由呼籲一起，使全 球領導人齊聚一堂，共同應對世界各地的宗教迫害問題。在這兩次部長級會議期間，美 國和其他夥伴國家發表聯合聲明，呼籲中華人民共和國政府尊重維吾爾族和其他突厥族 穆斯林、藏傳佛教徒、基督教徒和法輪功信徒的權利，這些人在中國都面臨著鎮壓和迫 害。2020 年 2 月，美國國務院與 25 個志同道合的夥伴共同發起成立了有史以來第一個國 際宗教自由聯盟，以捍衛每個人沒有恐懼的信仰權利。在 2019 年部長級會議期間，美國 總統與中國異議人士和倖存者會面，並在聯合國大會期間與來自中國的宗教迫害受害者 同台。美國還將繼續支持在中國境內（工作）或在中國（問題上）工作的人權鬥士和獨 立民間社會人士。
In
October 2019 at the United Nations in New York, the United States joined
likeminded nations in condemning Beijing’s ongoing human rights violations and
other repressive policies in Xinjiang that threaten international peace and
security. The latter event followed United States Government actions to stop
United States exports to select Chinese government agencies and surveillance
technology companies complicit in the Xinjiang human rights abuses and to deny
United States visas for Chinese officials, and their family members, responsible
for violating Beijing’s international human rights commitments. The United
States has also begun actions to block imports of Chinese goods produced using
forced labor in Xinjiang.
2019 年 10 月，在紐約聯合國總部大樓，美國與志同道合的國家一起譴責北京在新疆持續 侵犯人權和其他威脅國際和平與安全的鎮壓政策。在那之後，美國政府採取行動，禁止 美國向侵犯新疆人權的中國政府機構以及監控科技公司出口商品，並拒絕向對違反北京 國際人權承諾的中國官員及其家屬發放美國簽證。與此同時，美國還開始採取行動，阻 止進口在新疆使用強迫勞動生產的中國商品。
The
United States will continue to take a principled stand against the use of our
technology to support China’s military and its technology-enabled
authoritarianism, working in conjunction with likeminded allies and partners.
In doing so, we will implement policies that keep pace with rapid technological
change and PRC efforts to blend civil and military uses and compel companies to
support China’s security and intelligence services.
美國將與志同道合的盟國和夥伴合作，繼續採取原則立場，反對使用我們的技術來支持中 國的軍事及其科技化專制主義。在此過程中，我們將緊跟中華人民共和國的迅速科技變 革和致力於軍民融合的步伐，利用和迫使外國公司支援中國安全和情報服務。
These
efforts demonstrate United States commitment to the fundamental values and
norms that have served as the foundation of the international system since the
end of the Second World War. While the United States has no desire to interfere
in the PRC’s internal affairs, Washington will continue to be candid when
Beijing strays from its international commitments and responsible behavior, especially
when United States interests are at stake. For example, the United States has
significant interests in the future of Hong Kong. Approximately 85,000 United
States citizens and more than 1,300 United States businesses reside in Hong
Kong. The President, the Vice President, and the Secretary of State have
repeatedly called on Beijing to honor the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration
and preserve Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy, rule of law, and democratic
freedoms, which enable Hong Kong to remain a successful hub of international
business and finance.
這些努力顯示出美國對第二次世界大戰結束以來作為國際體系基礎的基本價值觀和準則的 承諾。雖然美國無意干預中華人民共和國內政，但當北京偏離其國際承諾和負責任的行 為時，尤其是當美國的利益受到威脅時，華盛頓會繼續直言不諱的指出。例如，美國對 香港的未來十分關心。大約有 85,000 名美國公民和 1300 多家美國企業長期在香港。美國 總統、副總統和國務卿多次呼籲北京尊重 1984 年的《中英聯合聲明》，維護香港的高度 自治、法治和民主自由，使香港繼續作為國際商業和金融中心。
The
United States is expanding its role as an Indo-Pacific nation that promotes
free enterprise and democratic governance. In November 2019, the United States,
Japan, and Australia launched the Blue Dot Network to promote
transparently-financed, high quality infrastructure through private sector led
development around the world, which will add to the nearly 1 trillion dollars
of United States direct investment in the Indo-Pacific region alone. At the
same time, the Department of State issued a detailed progress report on the
implementation of our whole-of-government strategy for the Indo-Pacific region:
A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision.
美國正在擴大其作為促進自由企業和民主治理的印太國家的作用。2019 年 11 月，美國、 日本和澳大利亞共同發起了 "藍點網路"，通過私營部門主導的全球發展，來推動資金透 明、高品質的基礎設施建設，僅在印太地區就將增加近 1萬億美元的美國直接投資。與此 同時，美國國務院發佈了一份關於實施我們印太地區整體政府戰略詳細進展的報告： 《一個自由開放的印太：推進共同願景》
Conclusion
結論
The
Administration’s approach to the PRC reflects a fundamental reevaluation of how
the United States understands and responds to the leaders of the world’s most
populous country and second largest national economy. The United States
recognizes the long-term strategic competition between our two systems. Through
a whole-of-government approach and guided by a return to principled realism, as
articulated by the NSS, the United States Government will continue to protect
American interests and advance American influence. At the same time, we remain
open to constructive, results-oriented engagement and cooperation from China
where our interests align. We continue to engage with PRC leaders in a
respectful yet clear-eyed manner, challenging Beijing to uphold its
commitments.
美國政府對於中華人民共和國的態度，反映了美國對於如何理解和回應這個世界上人口最 多的國家和第二大經濟體的領導人的看法進行了根本性的重新評估。美國認識到我們兩 個體系之間的長期戰略競爭。美國政府將通過採取整體政府的方式，在國家安全局所闡 述的回歸原則性現實主義的指導下，繼續保護美國的利益，提升美國的影響力。同時， 我們仍然願意接受中國與我們在利益一致的情況下進行建設性的、注重成果的接觸與合 作。我們將繼續以尊重而又清醒的方式與中華人民共和國領導人進行接觸，要求北京履 行其承諾。
翻譯： Ying202064 / Nami( 文花開 ) /小綿羊/小兔子愛吃糖
校對： Winston Jackson /Jennifer/Naomi
( 文花開 )/文青/
審核：/GM31 /Winston Jackson
